Myanmar Spring Chronicle – February 5 Scene
(MoeMaKa) February 6, 2026
The Spring Revolution at a Midpoint: 2026
In the aftermath of the election organized by the junta that controls Myanmar’s military, domestic sentiments and perspectives have been widely reflected in news reports and opinion pieces. These accounts describe how Myanmar people have little trust in the election, yet were compelled to vote under coercion, threats, and pressure. They also point out that the election was held only in a limited and fragmented manner despite the existence of many areas where voting could not take place at all; that the military-backed political party has the backing of the junta and may be able to form a parliament and government; and that the junta leader himself has taken steps to cling to power by enacting the Union Consultative Council Law as a mechanism to retain control rather than relinquish authority.
China has openly stated that it recognizes Myanmar’s military-run election, while ASEAN countries have responded in a more limited and cautious manner to the election results of their member state Myanmar. India, for its part, has only announced that it provided technical assistance to the election, which can be interpreted as a form of partial or indirect support.
The European Union rejected Myanmar’s election and called for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners. The United States government initially issued statements prior to the election suggesting a relatively positive assessment of the situation in Myanmar, and then announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Myanmar nationals residing in the U.S. However, after the election, the U.S. continued to designate Myanmar as a dangerous country for the United States and extended the national emergency declaration by another year.
Following Myanmar’s election, Thailand has indicated to ASEAN countries its willingness to help facilitate improved relations with Myanmar. This suggests a perspective that views Myanmar as entering some form of transitional period after the election, and encourages engagement with Myanmar’s crisis from that standpoint in order to promote movement or change.
Although clear analyses and assessments from civil society and academic experts have not been widely visible, the influential U.S. newspaper The New York Times published an article compiling views from within Myanmar after the military’s election. Extracting key points from that article, it argued that the National Unity Government (NUG), which positions itself as the vanguard of the Spring Revolution, has become disconnected from the people inside the country, while the junta managed to push through the election by any means and divert public attention amid widespread hardship. The article also highlighted mutual suspicion, corruption, misuse of funds, and reciprocal accusations among Myanmar’s revolutionary organizations. It further noted that armed ethnic organizations and the NUG have not yet been able to fully establish themselves as a united alliance. At the same time, it acknowledged that while the public’s expectations have not yet been fulfilled, it would be inaccurate to say that nothing has been done.
Historically, military governments and juntas have held elections repeatedly, but the present situation again demonstrates that elections have not provided an exit or solution to political or national crises. Ethnic armed organizations, in particular, have never accepted elections as a solution to political, military, or ethnic issues (in other words, to the question of the Union). Consequently, they have not laid down their arms to participate in the military’s elections. Instead, what has been more common are ceasefires with the junta, negotiated adjustments to control over territories, and limited agreements based on mutual interests.
In the Spring Revolution, the Kachin ethnic armed organizations led by the KIA—working alongside resistance forces from central Myanmar and the Dry Zone—the Karen ethnic armed organizations led by the KNU, and the Rakhine ethnic armed organizations led by the AA continue to engage in armed confrontation with the junta. This can be seen as concrete evidence on the ground. In one report quoting the speech of KIO Chair General N’Ban La on the 65th anniversary of the Kachin Revolution, he stated that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) is systematically coordinating with Spring Revolution forces to achieve greater military and political success, and warned against falling for the military’s divide-and-rule tactics. This makes it clear that ethnic groups remain firmly aligned with the trajectory of the Spring Revolution.
In summary, 2026 marks a midpoint for both the dictatorship and the revolutionary forces. The junta, having managed to stage an election, will have to derive either an exit, a turning point, or at least some form of change from the election results—even if not a genuine political transition. On the other hand, the Spring Revolution forces, which have managed to seize and operate in spaces carved out from the junta’s control despite the military’s inability to fully control nearly half the country, now face a decisive test. They must demonstrate through action whether they can protect, support, and sustain the people living in unstable areas; maintain public trust and cohesion; organize and consolidate effectively; and continue to escalate the momentum of the struggle—or whether their strength will begin to recede.
Write to Maung May