Myanmar Spring Chronicles
February 3
The Coup Regime Promulgates the Union Advisory Council Law
More than a week after the election organized by the coup-installed military, and ahead of the convening of a parliament in March that is expected to be dominated by representatives of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the current military leader has signed and promulgated a law establishing a Union-level body titled the Union Advisory Council Law. The council is described as an institution empowered to provide advice on governance and judicial matters.
This announcement comes amid recent rumors that coup leader Min Aung Hlaing was injured when the Central Command Headquarters inside the Mandalay Palace—where he was reportedly staying during a visit to Mandalay—was attacked with rockets by a Mandalay-based guerrilla group known as BWM. After several days of such speculation, photos were released today showing Min Aung Hlaing receiving the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council. On the same day, the Union Advisory Council Law was formally signed and announced.
Given that both the election and the legislature expected to emerge from it are not recognized by most countries and the United Nations, many are questioning why this law was enacted in advance of the parliament, using the authority of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The election itself was marred by opaque advance voting, direct and indirect pressure to vote for the USDP, and coercion targeting civil servants, members of the armed forces, and their families. As a result, in the three-phase election held between December 28 and January 25, the USDP—led largely by former military generals—secured the majority of seats.
This has also raised the question of why the regime did not wait until the parliament, where the USDP holds a majority, was convened before enacting the law to form the Union Advisory Council.
Comparisons are also being drawn with the State Counsellor Law introduced by the NLD after its victory in the 2015 election. At that time, the law was submitted and enacted only after parliament was convened, despite objections from military-appointed MPs. Nevertheless, it was approved with the NLD’s parliamentary majority. That law was clearly designed for a single individual, whereas the newly promulgated Union Advisory Council Law specifies the formation of a council consisting of no fewer than five members.
According to the law, the forthcoming Union Advisory Council will be authorized to provide advice and coordination on matters relating to security, rule of law, international relations, and peace. In other words, given its focus on defense, security, and foreign affairs, it can be inferred that the council is likely to be composed of former military generals.
This development raises various questions about Min Aung Hlaing’s future role: whether he intends to assume the presidency, remain as commander-in-chief, or position himself within this council to continue exercising control. There is little doubt that he desires the presidency. On election day, when a media outlet asked whether he would become president after the election, the satisfied expression on his face suggested that the question directly touched upon his personal ambition.
On the other hand, historical precedent shows that once military leaders retire, they eventually lose their ability to command and control the armed forces. This has occurred across two previous eras of former commanders-in-chief and regime leaders. After the 1988 uprising, former commander-in-chief Ne Win, who ordered the military takeover and then vanished from the political stage, found himself stripped of influence over subsequent coup leaders within a few years. Similarly, Than Shwe, who retired from both the military and government in 2010, also lost his influence over the military and the state after several years.
Min Aung Hlaing is well aware of these precedents. There is little doubt that he will attempt to put in place mechanisms, institutions, and guiding structures that allow him to retain influence over the military even after formally relinquishing his post.
The enactment of the Union Advisory Council Law may therefore be intended as a way to redistribute power. The 2021 coup demonstrated that institutions such as parliament, the government, and even the presidency are effectively powerless if the military chooses to defy or oppose them.
Because authoritarian rule inevitably has a limited lifespan, this law may be one element of Min Aung Hlaing’s advance preparations—aimed at ensuring continued control once he reaches a point where he can no longer remain in his military position.
In modern Myanmar history, military leaders have repeatedly seized power, and military-dominated institutions have ruled the country for nearly seven decades. Therefore, the ultimate goal should not merely be the removal or loss of power of Min Aung Hlaing himself, but the prevention of yet another military leader like him from rising up to take control of the country’s governance.