Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from February 22
MoeMaKa), February 23, 2026
Is this a time when the Myanmar Spring will face increasing internal and external conflicts?
At present, many are asking whether the political and military landscape has entered a period of transition. In reality, this question has always existed. Whenever events that capture public attention occur, people raise it more intensely. Public interest has risen recently due to events such as Bo Nagar from Pale surrendering to the Myanmar military, and the Permanent Secretary of the NUG Prime Minister’s Office stepping down after complaints from staff.
Additionally, the public is closely watching the steps the military might take following the election organized by the junta’s commission — whether the military will convene parliament, or initiate some form of power transfer. In truth, these developments are unlikely to bring tangible benefits to the public (in terms of livelihoods, security, or the ability to return home). However, there may be a faint hope that the military, political, and general repression they face could ease slightly.
The junta-controlled state media has announced that elected representatives from its sham election have been summoned to convene parliament on March 16, with sessions of the National Parliament reportedly set for March 18. These parliamentary meetings will only affect people living in areas under military control; they will have no meaningful impact on unstable conflict zones or ethnic mountainous regions.
Ethnic armed revolutionary organizations themselves appear not to be particularly interested in the publicized issues of Bo Nagar’s surrender, the resignation of the permanent secretary, or the elections and parliament. KIA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Gun Maw emphasized engagement with ethnic armed groups in northern and northwestern Myanmar. During the Kachin Revolution Day ceremony, he also spoke about relations with the Chin National Front (CNF) and armed groups in the Naga region.
Reports suggest that relations with their ally, the Arakan Army (AA), have become even stronger. There were also remarks stressing the need for stability in Sagaing Region. Similarly, the Karen National Union (KNU), in speeches delivered during Chin National Day ceremonies, emphasized maintaining and strengthening relations among ethnic armed revolutionary groups. They reiterated cooperation with Chin organizations, including the Chin Land Council, to build a federal union and declared their refusal to recognize the junta’s election and constitution.
In Sagaing Region’s Kanbalu District, strong ethnic armed forces such as the Arakan Army (AA), together with NUG’s armed wings — PDF battalions and People’s Defense Forces — are reportedly attacking and capturing military bases and columns. NUG-MoD’s No. 1 Military Region has also issued statements to this effect. These developments suggest mounting challenges for the Myanmar military regime and any parliament or government it attempts to establish.
Analysts believe that Chinese pressure and interference weigh heavily on ethnic armed organizations based in Shan State. Reports indicate friction in relations between the TNLA and MNDAA. However, leaders of these organizations have consistently stated that their differences can be resolved through negotiation and do not require armed confrontation. During such sensitive times, the Kachin National Organization (KNO) issued a statement on February 18 urging caution against inflaming internal conflicts. The KNO also called for an immediate halt to ongoing clashes between BNRA and NUG-PDF, SSPP/SSA and RCSS/SSA, MNDAA and TNLA, and among Karen armed groups. With the BNRA conflict currently paused, attention may now shift toward sustaining Pale and Yinmabin as revolutionary strongholds.
It is important to note that ethnic organizations have traditionally tried to avoid direct armed clashes with one another except in cases of self-defense. In Shan State, as KNO pointed out, groups like RCSS/SSA and SSPP/SSA have established channels of engagement, typically prioritizing negotiation. Political disagreements are usually addressed through statements rather than warfare. If an ethnic organization defects to the military junta, it is often labeled a national traitor — a severe stigma within ethnic communities. For this reason, such outcomes are generally avoided.
Since independence, the KNU — which has long taken up arms for ethnic liberation — has experienced numerous internal and external challenges, including divide-and-rule tactics and military offensives by successive regimes. Within the Karen resistance, the KNU serves as the political leadership body, while regional brigades handle local military responsibilities. Official KNU statements represent the organization’s political stance, while brigade commanders often articulate immediate, practical military realities.
Over time, splits have occurred due to political differences, leading to the formation of groups such as the BGF, DKBA, KNLA-PC, and most recently KTLA in 2022. Many of these breakaway factions operate in what was once the stronghold of Brigade 7. Despite this, the KNU generally seeks to avoid direct armed confrontation with these groups. There is a strong reluctance among Karen communities to resolve disputes through bloodshed. This stands as a lesson from history.
In the current situation, political leadership bodies and armed groups composed largely of ethnic Bamar, as well as broader revolutionary forces, appear to be increasingly confronting both internal and external political and military conflicts. While these tensions may have previously been less visible, more open disputes and confrontations are likely to emerge going forward.
The pressing question is whether these conflicts will be handled in a zero-sum, “you die, I survive” manner — as with the military dictatorship — or whether alternative approaches can be found that preserve public unity, understanding, and support while advancing strategically.