Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from February 14
(MoeMaKa) February 15, 2026
Inter-ethnic Conflict and Changing Socioeconomic Conditions in Northern Shan State
Northern Shan State—where the TNLA, MNDAA, SSPP/SSA, the military junta, and various militia groups are active—has undergone significant changes since the 2021 military coup, particularly after the first and second phases of Operation 1027. These changes are not limited to military control of territory; they also extend to major demographic shifts linked to shifting patterns of governance and authority.
For example, during Operation 1027, the Kokang armed group MNDAA captured Hsenwi (Theinni), a town predominantly inhabited by Shan people. Since then, reports have emerged in recent days that large numbers of Kokang people, along with Chinese nationals engaged in related business activities, have moved into the town.
According to 2023 administrative data, Hsenwi has a population of over 50,000. Of these, more than 30,000 are Shan, over 10,000 are Kokang (also known as Mone Won), and more than 5,000 are Kachin. However, rather than assuming that such demographic patterns remain fixed, it is possible that political, military, and administrative developments may drive changes over time.
More than a year after seizing Hsenwi during the first phase of Operation 1027, the MNDAA formally declared the town part of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and has continued implementing administrative functions accordingly.
Under the territorial designations of the 2008 Constitution, however, Hsenwi was not part of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone but fell under the administration of Shan State. Last year, directives were issued requiring business signboards in Hsenwi to include Chinese language text. This is likely intended to ensure accessibility for Kokang residents, who commonly use Chinese as both an official and everyday language.
Nevertheless, the increasing and, in some cases, mandatory use of Chinese may place pressure on other ethnic communities living in northern Shan State and could potentially fuel inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts.
Recently, in Kutkai—a town along the Mandalay–Muse Union Highway in northern Shan State—disputes broke out between the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) and the MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army). The tensions escalated to exchanges of gunfire, resulting in injuries to some soldiers. Over the past year, there were also disputes between TNLA and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), including incidents where TNLA forcibly removed a KIA liaison office. Kutkai has seen the presence of both TNLA and MNDAA forces, while the KIA had maintained a liaison office there even before Operation 1027.
Thus, friction has occurred not only between KIA and TNLA but also between TNLA and MNDAA. After the TNLA captured Hsipaw during Operation 1027, it replaced a Shan-language town entrance sign—which featured Shan ethnic symbols and script—with one in the Ta’ang language. Following objections from Shan residents, revisions were later made. A similar alteration of Shan ethnic symbols and language on the town entrance sign occurred in Namkham, which TNLA seized during the first phase of Operation 1027. However, unlike in Hsipaw, the incident in Namkham did not appear to draw strong public criticism in the media.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the armed groups that achieved military victories and territorial gains during Operation 1027 are now attempting, through various means, to consolidate and legitimize their control. At the same time, factors such as airstrikes and ground offensives by the military junta, along with pressure from China, have led to the relinquishment of control over certain towns and territories.
For instance, Lashio, Mogok, and Momeik—three towns previously seized by two ethnic armed organizations—were returned to the junta following negotiations. Meanwhile, the military retook Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw through renewed offensives.
China’s policy stance also plays a critical role, as the junta remains dependent on China for essential raw materials needed for military operations and weapons production. Beijing’s position may therefore significantly influence patterns of control and governance in northern Shan State.
For the ethnic armed organizations that secured military successes during Operation 1027, it is crucial that inter-ethnic issues among themselves are resolved through fair and historically informed approaches that reflect demographic realities—rather than through domination by the stronger party. Otherwise, there remains a real risk that the military junta, which governs through centralized and authoritarian command, could exploit divisions and reclaim lost territories through renewed offensives.