Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from February 18
MoeMaKa), February 19, 2026
BNRA Commander Bo Nagar Surrenders to the Military Junta
Forces under the National Unity Government (NUG), numbering from the hundreds to nearly a thousand, began attacking units led by Bo Nagar in Pale Township. These units were named the BNRA (Burma National Revolutionary Army). The following day, BNRA leader Bo Nagar (real name: Naing Lin) contacted the junta’s Northwestern Regional Military Command based in Monywa and surrendered.
The surrender was not carried out collectively by the entire force. Only Bo Nagar and some members of his family surrendered. It remains unclear what instructions, if any, he gave to the battalions and units under his command, or whether he fled on his own without providing direction.
The collapse of this roughly four-year-old local armed resistance group, which had been active in Pale and Yinmabin areas, will likely be viewed as a success by NUG-aligned battalions in the region that had been in conflict with Bo Nagar. After years of disputes, accusations, and tensions between the two sides, the fact that their rival ultimately surrendered to the military is being seen as proof that their side was in the right, and that the other side had betrayed the revolution.
In this incident, some have portrayed Bo Nagar—who had been at odds with NUG-aligned forces—as someone who had long been planted by the military, or at least as someone who had maintained secret connections with the junta even before this event. Although no solid evidence has been presented, the fact that the military reportedly transported him by helicopter and that he surrendered less than 48 hours after NUG forces launched their offensive has led some to draw conclusions that prior connections must have existed.
Others argue that due to mismanagement and improper conflict resolution among revolutionary armed groups—resorting to armed confrontation against one another—Bo Nagar may have felt cornered. While he may not have wanted to choose this path, he may have been pushed into surrender as a result of internal fighting and the unwillingness to sacrifice his life in resistance.
A few hours after Bo Nagar’s surrender, on the night of February 18, the NUG Ministry of Home Affairs issued an emergency statement detailing accusations against him. Within hours of that announcement, a separate decision regarding allegations of corruption, financial misconduct, and abuse of power against the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office—filed by former subordinates—was also released the same night.
As public attention was at its peak over Bo Nagar’s surrender, the investigation team had already faced criticism for failing to release findings from a corruption probe that had lasted more than two months. The fact that the announcement was issued on the same night as the surrender has sparked criticism over whether the timing was appropriate and transparent.
Some may question how Bo Nagar’s surrender became linked to corruption allegations against the Prime Minister’s Office Secretary. Critics suggest that when one major news story captures public attention, releasing another significant story within hours may be seen as an attempt to divert or dilute public focus.
Returning to the matter of Bo Nagar’s surrender: the surrender of a local defense force leader who had been in dispute with the NUG is undoubtedly a propaganda gain for the military. While many local defense forces continue fighting against the coup across central Myanmar and in some ethnic areas, this appears to be the first high-profile case of a well-known LPDF (Local People’s Defense Force) leader surrendering to the junta, rather than just rank-and-file members.
Whether Bo Nagar had been a military infiltrator from the beginning, or whether he decided to surrender due to pressure from NUG offensives, regardless of the reason, the impact on the armed resistance in central Myanmar—where the majority Bamar population resides—is almost certainly negative.
Bo Nagar likely possessed detailed knowledge about the locations, strengths and weaknesses of PDF units in Pale and Yinmabin, funding sources for the armed revolution, and supply routes for weapons procurement. If he disclosed such information to the military, the consequences could be severe. Furthermore, this development risks undermining public trust in the armed resistance among local communities.
The junta appears to view Bo Nagar’s surrender as a psychological blow to the Spring Revolution and quickly publicized the event within hours, releasing photographs alongside the announcement. They seem to fully understand the psychological and propaganda value of securing the surrender of a leader from a local defense force that had been fighting against military rule.
In central Myanmar, many LPDF groups operate independently under various “Bo” (commander) names. This incident could potentially set a precedent or open a pathway for further attempts to dismantle such autonomous defense groups.
At the same time, ongoing internal disputes and conflicts among revolutionary armed groups risk demoralizing the public. There is growing concern that such divisions may lead people to question whether victory in the Spring Revolution against military dictatorship is slipping further out of reach.