Myanmar Spring Chronicles, February 2
Banmauk Town — One of the Towns Being Repeatedly Captured and Recaptured
Banmauk, a township in Sagaing Region bordering Kachin State, was captured in late September last year after a joint offensive by the KIA and PDF forces. Around three months later, reports emerged in early February that the town had been retaken under the leadership of the Shan Ni National Army (SNA).
Over the past couple of days, a video clip circulated showing Shan Ni forces entering Banmauk town, along with reports that they had regained control of many parts of the town. The following day, further reports stated that the SNA had reestablished control over nearly all wards of Banmauk.
Banmauk is a town mainly inhabited by Shan Ni, Kadu, and Kanan ethnic communities. According to administrative data, the town has a population of more than 8,500. During the joint offensive by NUG-aligned PDF forces and the KIA in mid-September last year, junta troops, together with Shan Ni forces, had defended the town.
After KIA forces, together with PDFs, attacked and seized a town predominantly inhabited by Shan Ni people, ethnic hate speech between Shan Ni and Kachin communities spread widely on social media. Although it is said that Banmauk was attacked by PDF units under Military Region No. 1 of the NUG Ministry of Defense, there is a common understanding that KIA exercises command and control over military operations and strategies in Sagaing Region areas bordering Kachin State.
During the more than three months in which Banmauk was held by the joint KIA–PDF forces, the coup regime carried out aerial attacks, resulting in damage to homes, markets, and religious buildings in the town.
In videos released when Shan Ni forces retook Banmauk, damaged buildings can be seen. Roofs and structures of houses, fuel stations, monasteries, and other buildings appear to have been destroyed.
In upper Sagaing Region, before the battle for Banmauk, there had already been many towns where battles for control had taken place. The first such town was Htigyaint, located on the western bank of the Ayeyarwady River. After months of fighting there, neither side was able to secure complete control, and many buildings in the town were destroyed. Subsequently, a battle for Kawlin took place, and NUG/PDF forces captured and controlled the town for several months before the military retook it. After that, Indaw was attacked for more than eight months starting in August 2024 and was eventually captured in 2025.
A few months after the capture of Indaw, toward the end of last year, the battle for Banmauk was launched, and the town was seized and controlled.
After Banmauk was taken, in the final week of December—just days before the first phase of the election—NUG/PDF forces launched an offensive to capture Katha. However, even after more than a month, they have not yet been able to take control of Katha.
While the fighting in Katha was ongoing, reports emerged in early January that an attack would be launched on Wuntho, a neighboring town. However, to date, no town-capture battle has taken place there.
Instead of Wuntho, reports indicate that fighting has resumed in recent days in Htigyi (Htigyaint), a town that had previously experienced months-long battles for control in past years.
In this way, towns in upper Sagaing Region bordering Kachin State—such as Kawlin, Wuntho, Katha, Indaw, and Banmauk—are being captured and recaptured repeatedly. For local residents, this has meant having to flee their towns multiple times, or enduring repeated town-capture battles while hiding within the town itself—situations that are extremely difficult to endure.
For anti–military dictatorship forces, it may be unavoidable, both militarily and strategically, to seize these areas. However, in such circumstances, it is necessary to also consider how to maintain control after capturing a town and how to protect the civilian population.
If it has been decided that these towns must be taken because of their military strategic importance, then preparations must also be made in advance to ensure they can be held. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate to conduct town-capture battles merely as a tactical maneuver—intended to force the enemy to open another front or disperse their forces—without the capacity to sustain control.
In town-capture battles, civilians often lose the assets they have accumulated over their lifetimes: homes, livelihoods, clothing, and basic necessities. After such losses, it is not easy for them to recover. Many are forced to flee for their lives with nothing but the clothes they are wearing, and instead of sustaining themselves through their own work and businesses, they find themselves dependent on emergency aid such as rice packs, blankets, and clothing. Such situations are all too common.
These conditions can also undermine public support for revolutionary armed forces. Revolutionary groups should therefore reassess the consequences that arise from town-capture battles and take great care to avoid engaging in such offensives merely as tactical gestures without the real capacity to maintain control.
Since the revolution must place the interests of the people first, second, and third, this is a time to seriously reflect and reassess—to ensure that public opinion does not turn away and that the people do not become disillusioned.