Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from February 21
MoeMaKa), February 22, 2026
Among the regions where military operations are ongoing
They are Sagaing Region and Kachin State. If we examine where the junta forces are launching offensives and where defensive battles are being fought over certain towns and military bases, the areas include Kayin State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Rakhine State, Tanintharyi Region, the northwestern part of Ayeyarwady Region, the western part of Bago Region and areas east of the Rakhine Yoma bordering Kayin State, Mandalay Region, Chin State, and parts of Sagaing Region and Kachin State.
In Rakhine State, fighting that has been ongoing for nearly two years continues in Kyaukphyu Township. In the northwestern part of Ayeyarwady Region bordering Rakhine State—such as Ngathaingchaung, Laymyethna, and Thabaung townships—AA forces and local PDFs from Ayeyarwady are jointly fighting against the military. There are also clashes between the Arakan Army (AA) and the junta in areas west of Pyay in Bago Region, near the Rakhine Yoma. Additionally, in Magway Region’s Ngape Township, around the Nat Yae Kan camp near the old Padaung–Ann road, fighting has been ongoing for nearly two years.
These battles involve the AA and its allied PDF forces.
In Chin State, Chin defense forces are resisting the junta’s offensive aimed at retaking Falam town.
On the western front of Myanmar, the junta is engaged in multiple battlefronts in Ayeyarwady, Rakhine, and Chin States. In the north, it is also fighting the KIA in areas such as Hpakant and Bhamo. In northern Shan State, however, the junta currently has ceasefires with both the TNLA and MNDAA, so there is no active front there at the moment.
In southern Shan State, there were clashes in previous years with the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA), but there are no active battles at present. In Karenni (Kayah) State, the junta is launching offensives to regain territories it had lost in recent years. From mid-2025 to the present, it has regained control of areas including Loikaw, Demoso, and Hpruso, and most recently reoccupied Hpasawng, opening new offensive fronts.
In eastern Bago Region, including areas such as Nyaunglebin, the junta is currently in a defensive posture rather than conducting offensives.
Moving south from Karenni (Kayah), offensives are underway in Hpapun, Myawaddy, Lay Kay Kaw, and Phlu areas. Myawaddy is strategically important due to border trade with Thailand and its position along the Thailand–Myanmar–India section of the Asian Highway. The junta appears determined to fully regain control of Myawaddy Township. Along the Asian Highway, in Phlu and Min Let Pan, junta forces are launching offensives against joint KNU/KNLA forces.
Further south in Tanintharyi Region, clashes are occurring between the KNU/KNLA and local PDFs. While there are no major base-seizure battles aimed at retaking lost territory, it remains an area of frequent fighting.
Thus, from western Myanmar through the northern and eastern border regions, these are the battlefronts the junta is currently engaged in. In central Myanmar, the most active areas at present are those bordering Sagaing Region and Kachin State. Recently, Lt-Gen Gun Maw referred to the “K-three” area—Kanbalu, Kawlin, and Katha—where intense fighting is taking place between the junta and joint KIA–PDF forces. Both sides appear to regard these as strategically important territories.
Sagaing Region, with its vast territory and its role as a corridor between northeastern and western Myanmar, holds major strategic significance. For armed groups based in Shan State, Sagaing serves as a key transit route for connecting with central and western Myanmar. Its terrain also differs from regions like Mandalay and Bago, further enhancing its strategic importance.
For these reasons, it is crucial that revolutionary armed forces operating in strategically vital Sagaing Region maintain unity and coordinate military activities among themselves. Although NUG-affiliated battalions are reportedly the strongest forces in Sagaing, various local defense forces as well as groups such as the PLA and 96 Soldiers are also active.
The recent incident in which a BNRA leader and some followers surrendered to the junta has shaken not only Sagaing Region but also the broader Spring Revolution and the armed resistance movement. Beyond the risk of leaking sensitive information from the region, there is also the danger that it could set a precedent for further surrenders.
The armed resistance and military situation in Upper Myanmar, which has the capacity to threaten central Myanmar, plays a crucial role in the Spring Revolution. Revolutionary forces need to seriously consider and prioritize this reality.