Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 10 Snapshot
January 11, 2026
Will the Coup Regime’s Election Produce a Political Solution?
After the November 2020 general election, in which elected members of parliament emerged victorious, preparations were underway to convene the new parliament on the morning of February 1, 2021. Instead, the military arrested the president, the state counsellor, cabinet members, and senior leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD), declared a state of emergency, and imposed military administration across many townships. What began as a political dispute rooted in the election results reignited and accelerated Myanmar’s long-smoldering civil war, which had previously been buried beneath the ashes.
Had the military not rejected the 2020 election results and seized power, 2025 would have been the year for a regularly scheduled general election, following the completion of the NLD’s second term in office. Instead, the current reality is that many senior NLD leaders remain imprisoned, while others have gone into exile and formed the National Unity Government (NUG), declaring armed resistance aimed at forcing the military out of politics altogether.
Rather than swiftly holding new elections, the coup regime pursued a strategy of buying time—systematically fragmenting the NLD and pushing it out of the political arena. In the early stages, dissolving the party altogether appears to have been considered. Numerous NLD offices were destroyed or burned in the immediate aftermath of the 2021 coup. Later, as the NUG was formed and the People’s Defense Force (PDF) emerged, and as NLD lawmakers and party officials joined the armed resistance, direct targeting of the NLD as a civilian political organization diminished. Instead, the conflict shifted decisively toward armed confrontation between the junta and NUG/PDF forces in alliance with ethnic armed organizations.
As long as armed conflict continued unabated across the country, stability remained unattainable. The military therefore promoted a narrative that elections could not be held under such conditions. Throughout 2022 and 2023, junta leaders repeatedly stated that a return to “normalcy” was a prerequisite for any election. However, after suffering major territorial losses toward the end of 2023 and in early 2024, the military council came under pressure from China to proceed with elections.
China applied leverage to facilitate ceasefire arrangements with some members of the Northern Alliance in northern Shan State, while simultaneously encouraging the junta to hold elections as a means of stabilizing the political situation. In the early days of the coup, China did not openly and unequivocally endorse the military takeover. There were also reports—though never independently confirmed—that Beijing urged the junta not to dissolve the NLD. The Chinese Communist Party’s continued engagement with the NLD lends some credibility to these accounts.
The coordinated offensive launched on October 27, 2023, by three ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State marked a turning point in China’s Myanmar policy. The outcome prompted Beijing to oppose any scenario in which Myanmar would fragment into territories governed by disparate armed groups and to use diplomatic and economic means, as far as possible, to prevent such an outcome.
China subsequently decided to engage more directly with the coup regime and articulated its so-called “three non-interference principles” regarding Myanmar at the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation meeting held in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that China pressed the junta to hold elections as soon as possible. This interpretation is reinforced by recent remarks from Chinese Special Envoy Deng Xijun, who stated that the elections just held were a product of relations between the Chinese and Myanmar leadership—clearly indicating Beijing’s role in accelerating the electoral process.
It remains unclear whether China offered specific guidance on the structure or content of the elections. What is clear, however, is that the military organized the vote with a predetermined objective: an overwhelming victory for the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), composed largely of former military generals.
Election and party registration laws were revised to suit the characteristics and capabilities of the USDP, enabling it to dominate the 2025 elections. At the same time, the junta calculated that the NLD would be unable to participate, given that its key decision-makers and senior leaders remained imprisoned.
Under these conditions, it is evident that the elections could neither be free nor fair. Moreover, with fighting ongoing across large parts of the country—and with many areas lacking the conditions necessary for movement, campaigning, or the operation of polling stations—the legitimacy of the election itself is fundamentally questionable.
The 2025–26 Myanmar elections have failed to secure full endorsement not only from Western countries, but even from ASEAN member states. Even among more authoritarian, single-party systems within ASEAN—such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—there has been no clear, public declaration of support. The few countries that openly endorsed the elections and provided technical assistance include Russia, China, Belarus, and India. For China and India in particular, both neighboring states, support appears to be driven by the belief that an electoral pathway might reduce the intensity of conflict compared to continued warfare.
Domestically, several ethnic armed organizations and NUG/PDF forces have adopted policies aimed at opposing and obstructing the elections wherever possible, while only a small number of armed groups have provided limited cooperation.
International reactions to Myanmar’s elections suggest that the former generals who come to power through this process will not suddenly be recognized as the leaders of a legitimately elected government. In a context where there is widespread reluctance to engage with a government born of a sham election, it is equally clear that opposition forces must consolidate themselves into a strong, unified bloc capable of sustaining resistance and presenting a credible alternative.