Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 14 Snapshot
January 15, 2026
The Gradual Withdrawals from the NUCC and Myanmar’s Political Tradition
Since the early days following the 2021 military coup, a number of organizations have withdrawn from the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the first major umbrella body formed after the coup. Most recently, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) announced that it was temporarily suspending its participation—avoiding the direct wording of “withdrawal,” but effectively stepping back from the council.
In recent months, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) formally submitted letters announcing their withdrawal. About two months later, news emerged that the CRPH had also decided to suspend its involvement.
The CRPH, the most recent body to step back, consists of elected members of parliament from the National League for Democracy (NLD) who won the 2020 election. It has widely been understood as the body guiding and overseeing the National Unity Government (NUG).
The NUCC can accurately be described as a national alliance platform, initially formed by some of the earliest armed resistance groups to emerge after the coup, along with political parties and organizations active in political and human rights advocacy. At the time of its formation, interim state and federal unit committees or councils were not yet part of the structure; these bodies joined later.
According to an NUCC statement dated May 24, 2025, the council comprised 61 organizations and individuals, grouped into five categories. Prior to that date, the Kachin Interim Political Coordination Team (KPICT) and the overseas NLD organization had already withdrawn from the NUCC.
During the early phase of the Spring Revolution, the NUCC brought together a significant—though not complete—portion of the resistance forces. The NUCC served as the foundation upon which the NUG was formed, and it also played a key role in drafting the Federal Democracy Charter. However, over the course of the revolution, differences in views and approaches emerged among the NLD, the CRPH, and some ethnic armed organizations.
Given that the NUCC was composed of many groups with differing backgrounds, trajectories, and political positions, disagreements and divergences were inevitable. Nevertheless, if these differing perspectives and positions had been anchored to a shared objective and a common roadmap—or if there had been mechanisms to manage differences through dialogue without undermining the organization’s cohesion—the NUCC might have been able to continue moving forward as a unified body.
In reality, such conditions did not fully materialize. The successive withdrawals of ethnic armed organizations, the overseas NLD, and now the CRPH have weakened the NUCC and raised serious questions about its ability to continue pursuing its stated goals and strategic direction.
Myanmar’s political culture has long been weak in terms of “working together where there is agreement while allowing differences to be handled separately.” Similarly, from the outset, insufficient attention appears to have been given to thoroughly negotiating and codifying foundational elements such as objectives, vision, strategy, and procedures.
This, arguably, is why many political and military alliances in Myanmar have historically been short-lived.
There are also differing views regarding the NUCC itself. Some critics argue that it is inappropriate or unnatural for civil society organizations and human rights activists to be represented within a political–military alliance like the NUCC. Questions have been raised about whether civil society groups—such as strike committees, student organizations, and labor rights groups—should hold representative positions in a body that functions as a political and military coalition.
At the same time, some political and armed organizations have struggled to accept the normative standards and principled positions upheld by civil society groups.
Members of the NUCC have also written on social media about disagreements within the council over issues related to human rights, minority rights, and matters concerning ethnic armed organizations—areas where civil society activists and political-military actors often hold differing perspectives.
In the early days of the Spring Revolution, activist groups, minority rights advocates, human rights defenders, and labor activists stood at the forefront of the movement. During that period, pragmatic political calculations, military realism, and outcome-driven approaches were not yet dominant.
As the revolution entered a more prolonged phase, however, results-oriented thinking began to take precedence over the earlier emphasis on activism and minority-centered priorities. Under harsh ground realities, survival and tangible outcomes increasingly took priority, often at the expense of values, standards, and ideals that could no longer be foregrounded in day-to-day struggle.
The NUCC now stands at a crossroads: will it gradually fade away, like other alliances in Myanmar’s political history that emerged for a time and then dissolved? Or will its members engage in renewed dialogue, reassess their positions and perspectives, and attempt to rebuild the council into a stronger and more viable platform?
That, it seems, is the critical question facing the NUCC today.