Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 3 Scene*
January 4, 2026
The arrest of the Venezuelan president by the U.S. military and its possible implications for the world and Myanmar
On the morning of January 3, the third day of 2026, news outlets reported as breaking news that U.S. forces had arrested the president of Venezuela in the country’s capital, Caracas, and were transporting him to New York City in the United States. Reports also said that prior to the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro, the U.S. military carried out sudden airstrikes over Caracas.
Venezuela, which possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, has for some time been accused by former President Donald Trump of exporting narcotics to the United States. In recent months, the U.S. military has reportedly sunk multiple vessels in the Caribbean Sea that it claimed were smuggling drugs. Just days ago, the U.S. Navy also intercepted and detained two Venezuelan oil tankers.
At present, it is still unclear whether the United States intends to go beyond arresting the president and invade Venezuela, station troops, and intervene directly in forming a new government. However, the act of intervening in the politics of a Latin American country located in northeastern South America—across the Caribbean Sea from the U.S.—and violating international norms of state sovereignty by arresting a sitting president under accusations of drug trafficking is likely to shock countries across South America and the Caribbean.
It is widely understood that President Trump’s foreign policy places less emphasis on ideology—such as authoritarianism versus democracy—and more emphasis on natural resources, investment opportunities, and economic profit. From this perspective, the arrest of the Venezuelan president appears unrelated to whether he is an authoritarian leader, and instead clearly points toward securing access for major U.S. corporations to Venezuela’s vast oil resources.
Even close U.S. allies such as Canada and Denmark have previously been subjected to blunt statements about annexation or leasing territory (such as Greenland) for U.S. corporate interests. Viewed in that context, it is evident that the underlying motive behind removing a non-allied, authoritarian leader like Venezuela’s president is resource-based economic interest, not democratic principles.
The incident also undermines assumptions that under Trump the United States would not launch military actions against other countries. At a time when global instability is already widespread—and when many countries are increasing military spending, arms procurement, and troop recruitment*—this development risks acting as *fuel on an already raging fire.
As the world moves toward a multipolar balance—no longer dominated by just one or two military and economic superpowers—this incident may also encourage the belief that power alone determines outcomes, weakening the authority of international institutions like the United Nations and the agreements they uphold.
This comes as the world is still grappling with Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, heightened fears that China may attempt military reunification with Taiwan, Japan’s decisions to significantly increase defense spending, and ongoing instability in the Middle East involving Iran, Israel, and Gaza. Against this backdrop, the arrest of Venezuela’s president may further push countries toward tighter military and political blocs.
For Myanmar’s coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, the U.S. arrest of a sitting foreign president will almost certainly be seen as a deeply concerning precedent. While it would be an overreach to conclude that the U.S. will intervene directly in Myanmar, the message that global powers can remove another country’s leader if they choose is enough to unsettle authoritarian rulers.
On the other hand, this may also push Myanmar’s military to rely even more heavily on major powers such as Russia and China, both diplomatically and militarily. One possible outcome is that Myanmar’s junta may draw closer to China, including increasing arms purchases from Beijing to sustain its civil war efforts.
At the same time, the fact that Myanmar is not strategically vital to the United States—lacking oil resources and with its rare-earth-rich Kachin State bordering China—may provide the junta with some reassurance, as the likelihood of U.S. intervention at the level seen in Venezuela appears low.
However, the junta cannot afford to ignore one key issue: the cyber-scam criminal networks operating along the Thailand–Myanmar border. This problem could provide the United States with a justification to become more directly involved in Myanmar-related matters. By intensifying crackdowns on scam networks and reducing claims that U.S. interests are being harmed, the junta may attempt to weaken any rationale for external intervention.
In short, while Myanmar may not face immediate action akin to Venezuela’s situation, the evolving global landscape—and the precedents being set—remain a source of both concern and strategic calculation for the country’s military rulers.