Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 9 Snapshot
January 10, 2026
Shifts in Global Power Dynamics and the Myanmar Crisis
Myanmar’s decades-long unresolved civil war entered a new phase after the 2021 military coup, when public resistance against the junta reached unprecedented levels. This created opportunities for ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to expand territorial control. Following the coup, numerous newly formed armed groups also emerged. Among them, the People’s Defense Force (PDF) under the National Unity Government (NUG), which was established in direct opposition to the junta, can be regarded as one of the largest armed forces in terms of manpower and funding.
However, although the NUG’s PDF may be the strongest in terms of human and financial resources, even after five years it still cannot be compared to ethnic armed organizations in areas such as unified command-and-control, military experience, and the ability to manufacture non-improvised weapons and ammunition independently.
In recent days, ethnic armed organizations such as the Arakan Army (AA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have been launching offensives against towns and military bases controlled by the junta. In Rakhine State, AA forces are targeting military outposts and naval bases in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. In eastern Bago Region, fighting has intensified around Taungoo-Inn town along the railway line as part of an urban seizure operation. In Upper Sagaing Region, battles are ongoing around Bhamo and Katha, involving KIA forces and joint KIA–PDF units under the NUG.
Over the past five years, ethnic armed organizations, NUG-aligned PDF units, other local defense forces, and allied groups operating with EAO support have managed to seize large areas of territory. At the same time, some territories captured earlier have been lost again over the past year.
In summary, after five years of conflict, the outcome of Myanmar’s civil war remains inconclusive, with no clear victor. Some analysts argue that in early to mid-2024, when the balance appeared close to tipping toward a decisive outcome, China intervened by applying pressure on certain ethnic armed groups operating along its border, altering the trajectory of the conflict.
Others assess that divergences between the political and military objectives of ethnic armed organizations and those of the NUG and predominantly Bamar-led armed resistance groups have become increasingly evident. In other words, differing end goals have led to visible fractures and competing interests at certain stages.
Taken together, these analyses suggest that foreign influence has played a significant role in shaping the trajectory and outcomes of Myanmar’s civil war.
The junta has gained advantages over domestic resistance forces by leveraging strong alliances with neighboring China and Russia—a Eurasian power spanning Europe and Asia—allowing it to secure diplomatic backing as well as military hardware and technology.
From late 2025 through the first week of 2026, major shifts have become apparent in the global posture, approaches, alignments, and interests of the world’s great powers.
In particular, policy shifts under the Trump-led administration in the United States are expected to have significant impacts on Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and the Middle East. Since the transfer of presidential power on January 20, 2025, sweeping and often unexpected reversals in trade policy, foreign policy, and international development assistance have occurred.
Numerous U.S. policy decisions and executive orders affecting Myanmar and its citizens have already been issued. Compared to policy changes throughout 2025—such as cuts to international development aid, visa restrictions, refugee policies, and tariff adjustments—the policy shifts implemented in the first week of 2026 are likely to have even greater impacts on Myanmar.
Examples include the deployment of special forces to Venezuela to arrest its president; U.S. statements indicating that military options, including force, could be considered to acquire Greenland; and declarations that the United States may intervene militarily in Mexico if its government fails to control drug cartels. These moves signal a disregard for the long-standing international legal principle of respecting state sovereignty. In the Middle East, reports of CIA involvement in encouraging protests in Iran and rhetoric suggesting possible military action against Iran further demonstrate how U.S. policy shifts are reverberating across multiple regions.
These developments and sweeping policy changes will not be confined to Latin America, Europe, the North Atlantic, or the Middle East alone.
The precedent of arresting a sitting Venezuelan president effectively opens the door for other major powers to justify similar actions. This could also alter the trajectory of the nearly four-year-long Russia–Ukraine war. In East Asia, tensions over Taiwan, disputes in the South China Sea, and deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations—when combined with U.S. policy shifts—create conditions in which regional wars or limited conflicts could erupt anywhere. Under the banner of national security and national interest, major powers may increasingly resort to intervention and invasion.
Some may dismiss these views as overly pessimistic or as fears of unlikely scenarios.
In reality, however, the global situation is approaching a state comparable to the conditions of the 1930s, prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.
Even if this does not amount to an inevitable world war, the current environment closely resembles that era: great powers prioritizing their own interests above all else, and the notion gaining strength that if one country can act in a certain way, others are equally entitled to do the same.
Just as the League of Nations lost its influence in the 1930s, the present state of the United Nations mirrors that decline. In recent times, the United States has withdrawn from several UN-affiliated agencies, reinforcing a unilateral, “every nation for itself” approach to global affairs.
Given this evolving landscape, it is time for Myanmar’s political organizations and armed groups to fully grasp these realities and reassess their strategies, positions, and practical courses of action.
History offers a lesson: on the eve of the Second World War, Burmese independence activists—initially seeking contact with the Chinese Communist Party—ended up connecting with Japan, traveling there for military training, and ultimately being exploited under Imperial Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity strategy. This historical experience remains a cautionary tale from the past.