Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 2 Scene*
January 3, 2026
Renaming BGF units as the KNA and its possible implications
Starting on January 1, battalions under the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) led by Saw Chit Thu began replacing their insignia with the Karen National Army (KNA) branding. Some reports also say that certain battalions will remain as “BGF” and will not switch to the KNA label.
The idea of renaming the force as the KNA first surfaced in January 2024, before the offensive operations later launched in late March and early April 2024*—including seizures of the *Thin Gan Nyi Naung strategic base area, some battalion positions, and the Myawaddy town defense. During that period, Saw Chit Thu reportedly met in Hpa-an with the junta’s second-most powerful figure, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, and media reports claimed the BGF discussed rebranding as the KNA and no longer accepting junta support.
At the start of 2024, the context was that Operation 1027 had been underway for roughly two to three months, and revolutionary armed forces were gaining the upper hand in multiple theatres—northern Shan, Karenni, Karen, Rakhine, Chin, and others—while the military regime was facing repeated setbacks.
In that environment, it is plausible to interpret the BGF’s move—under Saw Chit Thu—as an attempt to (1) build workable relations with forces that were increasingly dominant on the battlefield, and (2) begin ending its identity as a “border guard” force operating under the military’s command structure. At the same time, the BGF already had substantial revenue streams linked to scam (fraud) operations in Myawaddy Township, making junta material support comparatively less attractive.
BGF’s posture during the 2024 Myawaddy battles
During the late March–early April 2024 fighting—when the KNLA and allied forces attacked the Thin Gan Nyi Naung strategic base and the three Rapid-Reaction battalions (355, 356, 357) that protected it—the BGF did not clearly intervene to fight alongside the junta, nor did it assist the KNLA coalition.
When KNLA and allied forces seized LIB 275 (widely viewed as a key Myawaddy defense unit), BGF forces reportedly helped junta troops withdraw toward Myawaddy and toward the Thai border near Friendship Bridge No. 2. The BGF also provided security in Myawaddy and protected junta civilian department staff working at cross-border checkpoints between Myawaddy and Mae Sot.
In short, the BGF appears to have tried to reduce the impact of the junta’s losses while avoiding direct clashes with KNLA-led allied forces. This also helps explain why, despite pressure and opportunities, KNLA-allied forces did not attempt to fully and firmly control Myawaddy—doing so could have increased the risk of friction or confrontation with the BGF.
Shift in 2025: international scrutiny of scam networks
By early 2025, international attention increasingly focused on cross-border scam/criminal networks. This created pressure for armed groups in the Myawaddy border area to demonstrate some level of enforcement action—at least symbolically.
This pressure applied not only to the BGF but also to another Karen armed group active along the Thai border, the DKBA (Klo Htoo Baw), which has also been accused in reporting of providing protection and space for scam networks. As foreign governments paid more attention, the two main armed actors widely associated with protection of scam operations in Karen State—BGF and DKBA—were pushed toward closer engagement with the junta, including seeking help or cover in managing the fallout.
Both groups later announced, around mid-2025, that they would help provide security for the junta’s planned election process.
Meanwhile, the junta sought to regain international legitimacy by visibly acting against scam networks. That included destroying scam-related buildings in BGF-controlled areas. In recent days, there were also reports of the junta moving into and occupying parts of the Shwe Kokko area without notifying the BGF. It is not possible to state with certainty whether those incidents are directly linked to the BGF’s shift to KNA branding—but the timing invites scrutiny.
Not all battalions may switch; internal splits but “no armed conflict” expected
Some reports say a number of BGF battalions—particularly those associated with Bo Mote Thone*—will remain under the BGF label rather than changing to KNA. Those same reports claim that the split between “switching” and “non-switching” elements is *not expected to lead to armed confrontation between the factions.
What the rebrand may signal
Overall, the KNA rebranding can be read as part of a survival strategy by Saw Chit Thu’s force amid:
- growing pressure tied to anti-scam crackdowns,
- the junta’s own offensive objectives in Karen State and Myawaddy border areas, and
- the need to keep options open with multiple actors.
In the background are overlapping forces shaping the southern theatre: efforts to avoid inter-Karen armed conflict; resistance to military dictatorship; organizational survival; and—critically—financial incentives for armed leaders tied to the protection of scam networks. Together these political, economic, and military “balance-of-power” dynamics continue to define the evolving landscape in parts of southern Myanmar adjoining Karen State.