Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 29 Scene*
(MoeMaKa) January 30, 2026
Myanmar’s Sham Election and ASEAN’s Stance
In recent weeks, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Theresa Lazaro, whose country currently holds the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN—the Southeast Asian bloc made up of 11 member states—visited Naypyidaw in her capacity as the representative of the ASEAN chair. Her visit took place just days before the completion of the third phase of Myanmar’s election, which armed resistance groups and overseas political forces opposing the military regime have widely described as a sham election.
At a time when these groups have been calling on ASEAN not to recognize the Myanmar military junta, not to allow junta representatives to attend ASEAN meetings, and not to channel ASEAN humanitarian assistance through the coup regime, the visit by the foreign minister of the ASEAN chair country has raised concerns among opposition forces.
These concerns centered on whether ASEAN might accept the results of the sham election, or whether ASEAN was moving toward recognizing an election organized and overseen by the military junta. However, in the days following her visit, the Philippine foreign minister clarified that ASEAN as a whole does not recognize the election conducted by the military.
That said, she also noted that while ASEAN as an organization does not recognize Myanmar’s election, a significant number of ASEAN member states view the election as a potential positive step toward change. Although she did not name these countries, it is widely assumed that they may include Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
At a recent ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting held in the Philippines, Thailand’s foreign minister, Sihasak, stated that ASEAN needs to pursue a calibrated re-engagement with Myanmar. He argued that ASEAN should accept the post-election reality and adjust its actions to match the situation on the ground. He also emphasized that Thailand, unlike many other countries, is directly affected more severely by developments in Myanmar—suggesting that Thailand’s perspective may differ from that of other ASEAN members.
Thailand’s position can be understood in light of ongoing realities: refugees fleeing conflict in Myanmar crossing into Thailand, daily illegal border crossings by people seeking work in Thailand or passage onward to Malaysia, and even incidents where fighting near the border has resulted in stray shells landing inside Thai territory, causing damage and injuries. These direct impacts help explain Thailand’s calls for a more pragmatic approach.
In fact, just weeks before the election, Thailand’s foreign minister had already expressed hope that the election could serve as one step along a broader political reform pathway.
Meanwhile, Timor-Leste, a relatively new ASEAN member, has taken a markedly different stance. After Timor-Leste’s leaders met openly with the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) regarding the Myanmar military’s human rights violations, the Myanmar junta summoned Timor-Leste’s ambassador and issued a warning. The junta accused Timor-Leste of interfering in the internal affairs of another ASEAN member state.
Since late 2021, Myanmar’s military has been barred from sending politically appointed representatives to ASEAN meetings—a restriction that has now lasted nearly four years. This limitation has been maintained because the junta has failed to implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus.
All of these positions, conditions, and stances remained in place through the election period. What remains uncertain—and is now a matter of keen interest—is how ASEAN’s posture may shift after the election.
While some ASEAN member states sent election observation teams to Myanmar, others did not. Even in cases where no observers were dispatched, embassies operating inside Myanmar are expected to report their assessments and findings to their respective governments. As a result, ASEAN countries are already well aware of the election’s lack of fairness, lack of freedom, discriminatory practices favoring military-backed political parties, and unequal treatment of other political parties.
However, as Myanmar’s armed conflict and civil war—triggered by the 2021 coup—approach the five-year mark, ASEAN governments may increasingly believe that the Myanmar crisis cannot be resolved through a clear-cut victory or defeat by either side. Based on this assessment, there are growing signs that ASEAN may be preparing for increased engagement if the military regime reemerges under the appearance of an elected civilian government—essentially changing its outward form while retaining its core power.
These signals suggest that, following the election, ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar may evolve toward deeper engagement rather than continued isolation.