Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 17 Scene
January 18, 2026
How will armed groups resolve friction among themselves?
Myanmar’s military claims it is achieving the outcomes it wants in the second phase of the election, and its media outlets are broadcasting that message with great fanfare. In addition, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Myanmar is facing a case concerning the genocide of the Rohingya, the military side’s pleadings are being presented in detailed news articles and reports. It has also been acknowledged that the Myanmar military recognized and used the term “Rohingya.”
It is reported that in a speech delivered by Brigadier General Aung Gyi at the 1961 disarmament ceremony of Mujahid armed groups, the term “Rohingya” was used. The account says that when Mujahid groups requested that they not be called “Bengali” and instead be referred to as “Rohingya,” the government accommodated that request in order to make state authority effective.
Another notable point found in the military’s rebuttal is an implicit admission of a governing mindset that divides the country’s communities into “ethnic nationalities” and “non-ethnic/foreign races,” rather than treating them equally. One example cited is that at the time, Myanmar Radio separated programming into two categories: “ethnic-language programs” and “border-area minority programs.” Because the Rohingya (then referred to as “Bengali”) broadcast program was not regarded as an “ethnic nationality” program, it was placed under “border-area minority programs”—a classification that, the submission claims, can be verified through daily newspapers from 1961. The author suggests this reflects a continuity with colonial-era practices, when the British also administered the “hills” and the “plains” under separate systems.
As the military moves toward the third phase of the election, reports say the USDP—the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party—is winning the most seats so far in Phase (2). The USDP has claimed it has already secured 146 seats in the lower house. Reports also note that, if these seats are combined with the 25% of seats reserved for military appointees, the USDP says it can form a government.
On January 15, the election commission announced the names and vote results of 52 lower-house candidates who won in Phase (2). Of those 52 seats, 44 were reportedly won by the USDP. According to the commission’s Phase (1) announcements, the USDP had already gained 102 lower-house seats; when combined with the Phase (2) winners, the total becomes 146 seats. Since Phase (3) is also expected to end in their one-sided favor, the party may already be speaking openly as if its long-held “dream” of forming a parliament and a government is about to become reality.
Alongside election news and the ICJ courtroom scenes from The Gambia’s case, what has most captured public attention is the tension—mutual arrests, accusations, and condemnations—between Bo Nagar’s resistance armed group in central Myanmar and armed units under the NUG’s township People’s Defense Forces (PaKaFa).
According to Myanmar Now, in Pale Township, Sagaing Region, a local NUG checkpoint was raided this morning by the locally based Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA). During the raid, shots were fired; a checkpoint officer was detained; and two firearms were taken, based on information from the township PaKaFa. The report adds that BNRA—widely known as “Bo Nagar’s force”—raided an NUG tax checkpoint in Pan Village at around 11:30 a.m. on January 17, firing shots and detaining Ko Min Khine, a member of the People’s Security (PaLaFa), according to township PaKaFa deputy Dr. Nan Win. Prior to this incident, there had already been a case in which NUG forces raided Bo Nagar’s tax checkpoint and seized weapons. Reports also mention disputes and direct confrontations among lower-level fighters within the area.
In Myanmar, after many armed groups emerged, it was common in the early period to hear that tensions and disputes were reported to the NUG’s defense, home affairs, and judicial mechanisms—through complaints, incident reports, and requests for adjudication. More recently, however, the pattern has shifted: public statements often come first, with each side speaking for itself and issuing accusations against the other. The language about “seeking solutions” has become quieter. The author notes that unless a mediating body or mechanism can be established to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation between the sides, it will not be easy to extinguish the flames of conflict.
As an illustrative example, political and military positions have diverged to such an extent that various political and armed organizations have already withdrawn or temporarily suspended participation from the NUCC—an alliance they had once formed together. In the early revolutionary period, NUCC seemed to function as a meeting point and a mediation culture/mechanism: a place that included strike groups, social organizations, human-rights actors, student unions, minority activists, and those who did not take up arms or partisan politics—so that coordination, negotiation, and problem-solving could take place. But after armed groups and politically interest-driven organizations pulled back and withdrew, the need has become more obvious: when armed and political groups face disputes that require resolution, an impartial, trusted pillar—a clean, credible mechanism for mediation—is vital.
At this stage, within the revolution, the idea that “we will work with those who agree with us, and separate from those we differ with” may sound like a convenient justification. Yet the author argues that people must think ahead about how to prevent harmful outcomes—splits, conflicts, and escalation—caused by disagreements that emerge halfway along the path.
If both sides insist they are right, then a culture of mediation and problem-solving is needed—along with trusted, respected community arrangements that can arbitrate fairly and credibly. Without such protective arrangements, the author warns, the likely outcome is that an unwanted actor—an organization, or even a foreign state—may step in, using power to intervene and impose influence.