Myanmar Spring Chronicle — January 25 Scene*
(MoeMaKa) January 26, 2026
Final phase of the junta-run election concluded
The third and final phase of the election organized by the Tatmadaw — the military that seized power in 2021 — concluded on January 25. Out of Myanmar’s 330 townships, the first phase was held in 102 townships, the second in 100, and the third in 63 — a total of 265 townships. That means 65 townships had no voting at all. Even among those 265 townships where voting was reported, in some places the exercise amounted to little more than a token event. Because of the security situation the election could not be held nationwide, nor even within single districts in some cases. In areas, states, and villages controlled by resistance armed groups, there was no opportunity to hold polls at all; likewise, in some areas neither the resistance nor the military could fully control the ground, and elections could not be carried out there either.
Why was the vote split into three phases? The short answer is that the authorities did not have adequate security forces to hold voting simultaneously across many locations — after finishing voting in one place they had to redeploy security units to the next location. In the span of recent decades this election will go down as one of the narrowest in terms of geographical coverage; it will also be recorded as one of the least free multi-party democratic elections in Myanmar’s history.
Five years after the military seized power citing alleged irregularities in the 2020 election results, the junta-supervised 2025 vote is widely viewed domestically and internationally as an election engineered to produce the outcome the military desires. In recent weeks the military has begun to step back and people who joined the so-called Stability Party have been named to lead a government expected to be formed in the coming weeks.
Although the junta alleged fraud and voter-list errors in the 2020 election to justify its takeover, the 2025 vote — held under military supervision — already ranks historically as one of the least free and most violent elections Myanmar has seen, and as one with the smallest area in which voting was actually possible since the country’s modern-era ballots began.
Compared to earlier eras, this election produced more bloodshed and casualties than many previous contested votes in the country’s history. From the very beginning — during voter-list collection — election workers were arrested, shot, injured, or killed; in subsequent stages both civilian election staff and party candidates and representatives who took part in the process were also shot and assassinated. On a nationwide scale the number of killings and injuries likely ranges from the tens into the hundreds.
The obvious question now is: what political changes will arise from such a blood-soaked election? What real impact will it have? For people inside the country, living in unfree political conditions and amid a wide-ranging civil war, many were unable to participate — having fled their villages and towns, sheltering in other towns, in forests or mountains. Those who fled lost the opportunity to take part, and more fundamentally they lost access to the basic security and services they want: peace in their hometowns, protection from forced conscription of their children into fighting, relief from taxation when they have no income, schools so children can study, and hospitals to treat the sick and wounded — the essential needs that people care about more than the formal holding of an election in a war zone.
It is clear that the Stability Party government the junta intends to create will not be able to meet those everyday needs. On the other hand, questions remain about whether ethnic armed organizations, the PDF units under the National Unity Government (NUG), and the various other PDF and Pa Ka Pha groups operating under different names can provide the governance and services people need.
Neither the junta nor the newly constituted Stability Party appear able to deliver what ordinary people require. At the same time, many of the armed groups — the ethnic armies, the PDFs under the NUG, and various locally organized Pa Ka Pha units — do not yet present a clear picture of how they would fill that gap. Although most armed groups broadly agree on the aim of building a future federal democratic union, they lack a common, concrete strategy and coordinated plan to defeat the military regime.
Hatred of the junta alone will not be enough to build a durable federal union. That may sound blunt, but it is a practical truth. The various armed organizations and political groupings must urgently seek a shared roadmap — a unified approach that has the best chance of achieving their common political goals.
The military is likely to formally hold its staged election, then within a few weeks convene an assembly and move to steer the country onto the path it intends. For anti-junta forces, the time has come to develop and adopt a single, practical course of action among the differing armed factions so they can effectively work together to end military rule.