Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 11 Snapshot
January 12, 2026
Elections and Violent Attacks
As the coup regime conducted the second phase of its election, it became apparent that ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Force (PDF) units under the National Unity Government (NUG) were carrying out simultaneous operations: surprise shootings and ambushes targeting polling stations, election commission staff, and some towns where the election was being held, as well as drone bombings and incursions into towns to attack.
A few days before the second-phase voting day, a convoy that included members of the Union Election Commission traveled from Naypyidaw toward Magway under security escort. The Naypyidaw PDF attacked the convoy on the Myothit–Kanpyar road. Reports said the Myothit township police chief, a police station commander, and a personal security officer attached to an election commission member were killed.
In eastern Bago Region, KNLA and allied forces reportedly entered Taungkywe Inn town on the Yangon–Mandalay railway line shortly before the election, attacking the town and burning and destroying the election commission office and other administrative buildings, according to reports.
On January 11, the day the second phase of the election was held, reports said that in Kanma Township (Magway Region) a PDF armed group ambushed a Kanma township administrator and his team while they were traveling to inspect polling stations in villages, killing the administrator.
On the same day, another report said PDF forces carried out a drone-bomb attack on the General Administration Office in Htantabin Township (Bago Region), killing an assistant director from the township General Administration Department. The report also said that many other staff were injured.
In Salin Township (Magway Region), reports said that during the second phase of the election, residents heard gunfire in town. PDF units reportedly shelled areas inside the town where voting was taking place, and junta forces returned fire.
These incidents—occurring in Bago and Magway Regions—include election-related ambushes, town-seizure operations, and drone-bomb attacks. It is likely that these actions were carried out in line with prior statements by NUG-aligned PDF forces and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), which have labeled the vote a “sham election” and declared their intent to prevent it, including by punishing those involved in implementing the process.
The NUG’s stated position on the ongoing election is that it is an attempt by the coup regime to legitimize continued military rule, and therefore should be obstructed to the greatest extent possible. The KNU/KNLA has also strictly prohibited any election-related activities in areas under its control and has warned the public not to participate in the election process.
Most of the attacks and shootings linked to the election appear to be occurring in areas where NUG-aligned PDF units operate and in areas where KNLA forces are active.
The efforts by the NUG and the KNU/KNLA to prevent the election from succeeding appear to be having a measurable impact. Some units under the NUG have told the media that they are taking care to avoid harming civilians. At the same time, however, there have also been deaths and injuries among some civilian officials associated with the election process. Armed personnel such as police have suffered casualties, and there have also been deaths among some General Administration staff and Election Commission personnel.
Around January 11, when the second phase was held, there were noticeably more attacks on towns and camps, ambushes, and targeted shootings than during the first phase. The coup regime nonetheless appears determined to proceed with the election in three phases, on the dates it has set. It has justified holding the election in three parts by citing insufficient security personnel. In practice, however, what matters most is not voter turnout, but securing the election outcome it wants.
It is already evident that the regime will take steps to produce its desired result: the use of advance votes whose numbers cannot be independently verified, pressure on civil servants to vote, threats that ordinary citizens may lose certain benefits if they do not vote, and other measures aimed at ensuring the outcome it seeks.
In my view, revolutionary forces should not treat anti-election activity as their central strategy. Instead, they should place greater emphasis on a military strategy aimed at decisively defeating the authoritarian military.
Once election results emerge, a new government led by former generals—who have only recently retired from the military and changed into civilian attire—is almost certain to attempt to win over regional countries and neighboring powers through political maneuvering and persuasion.
It is therefore urgently necessary for the NUG and other revolutionary forces to adopt clear and firm military, political, and diplomatic strategies capable of competing with that civilianized, ex-military-led government.