Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 15 Snapshot January 16, 2026
Drug Manufacturing Facilities in Hsipaw Township Seized by the Junta
In recent days, the coup regime escorted international diplomats, United Nations agencies, and some domestic media outlets to locations in Hsipaw Township and Mongyai Township in northern Shan State, where it claims to have seized drug manufacturing factories, laboratories, large quantities of narcotics, and raw materials used in drug production. On the return trip, the military held a press briefing at a base near Pyin Oo Lwin.
Earlier reports had emerged that on January 10 and 11, the military carried out airstrikes on certain locations within territory controlled by the Shan State Progress Party / Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).
Under normal circumstances, clashes between the SSPP/SSA and the junta are rare. The SSPP/SSA is one of the ethnic armed organizations that has continued to adhere to a ceasefire agreement that predates the 2021 coup. During recent years—particularly while Operation 1027 was unfolding across northern Shan State—the SSPP/SSA largely avoided involvement in fighting, focusing instead on defending its controlled territories through various tactical measures without expanding or losing ground.
Some ethnic armed organizations have accused the SSPP/SSA of assisting junta forces, or of allowing the military to pass through SSPP/SSA-controlled territory during offensives or retreats. The SSPP/SSA has rejected these allegations, stating that they are untrue.
From a broader perspective, even if the junta does not maintain particularly close relations with the SSPP/SSA, it appears to have preferred avoiding the opening of additional fronts and the creation of new enemies under current conditions. As a result, there have been no direct clashes between the two sides in recent years. However, there have been incidents during this period in which the military conducted raids against certain scam operations—often referred to as “pig-butchering” scam gangs—accused of operating in areas of northern Shan State under SSPP/SSA control.
According to the junta’s spokesperson, the raids on drug manufacturing facilities, laboratories, raw materials, and finished products in this region were conducted following intelligence provided by China. While it is not publicly known what specific intelligence-gathering methods China used to identify drug facilities located in Hsipaw and Mongyai townships—areas that are not directly on the border—it is widely assumed that satellite surveillance and continuous aerial monitoring were involved. China is believed to be closely monitoring activities in northern Shan State, including drug production, scam syndicates, and potentially the movements of armed groups.
The junta claims that the drugs seized during these operations have an estimated total value exceeding 1.6 trillion Myanmar kyats, according to official statements.
Within days of the seizures, the SSPP/SSA released its own statement regarding the incident. The group stated that it has no involvement in drug production and added that if any individuals connected to the SSPP/SSA were found to be involved, they would be investigated and held accountable.
According to reporting by the Shwe Phee Myay news outlet, the locations in Hsipaw and Mongyai townships where the drug facilities were seized are areas where junta forces, the Mongha militia, and the SSPP/SSA had previously operated. These areas reportedly came under reduced junta control following Operation 1027, during which the military lost ground.
Throughout decades of civil war, even when the Myanmar military was not directly involved in drug production or trafficking, it often turned a blind eye to narcotics manufacturing and trade conducted by militias operating as buffer forces between the army and ethnic armed organizations, or by pro-junta militias that fought alongside the military.
Over more than 70 to 80 years of conflict in Shan State, numerous militias have emerged under different names. Alongside armed groups fighting for national liberation against successive governments—from the AFPFL era to the BSPP and SLORC/SPDC regimes—there have also been many warlords engaged primarily in drug production and trafficking, with little or no political agenda.
Figures such as Lo Hsing Han and Khun Sa became internationally notorious as drug warlords, but many lesser-known militias and smaller warlords also emerged. For these armed groups, drug production and trafficking became a primary means of sustaining their organizations—financing weapons purchases, ensuring group survival, and enriching leaders. In this sense, narcotics became a defining “curriculum” of Shan State’s civil war.
Government armed forces can fund their military expenditures through access to national resources and tax revenues. In contrast, it has been relatively rare for non-state armed groups to remain entirely uninvolved in drug production, trafficking, transportation, or protection networks.
Even ideologically strong and tightly centralized organizations such as the Communist Party of Burma were not entirely free from involvement in the narcotics trade at lower command levels, even if such activities were not officially sanctioned by the organization.
In the current phase of Myanmar’s civil war, drug production, trade, and trafficking continue to function as a form of fuel sustaining armed conflict. Reports indicate that as the civil war has expanded, drug production has also increased. Myanmar has now ranked for several consecutive years as the world’s largest producer of opium and has also become a major producer of synthetic stimulant drugs.
Civil war and narcotics production and trafficking form a deeply intertwined cycle that is extremely difficult to break.
Because revenue from local taxation or extortion alone is insufficient to cover the costs of war in many areas, some armed groups have turned to providing protection or land access for scam syndicates and other criminal enterprises. In doing so, certain groups have drifted entirely away from political objectives and toward criminalized survival strategies.
Seen in this broader context, the recent seizures in Hsipaw and Mongyai townships can be understood as just one small fragment of a much larger, long-standing pattern.