Myanmar Spring Chronicles January 24
Changing Military Situation in Myawaddy Township
Over the past year and a half, the situation in Myawaddy Township, Karen State, has gradually shifted from a period in which revolutionary forces were able to seize territory and military bases to one in which the coup regime’s military has steadily regained ground. With assistance from Border Guard Force (BGF) units led by Saw Chit Thu, the junta has been able to re-enter, reoccupy, and reassert control over a number of areas. In addition, under informal non-aggression principles among Karen armed organizations, some territories have been effectively returned to the control of the military regime.
Compared to the situation in April 2024—when the Kokko–Thingangnyinaung section of the Asia Highway was completely lost, battalions and tactical command bases in Thingangnyinaung fell, control of Myawaddy town was relinquished, and the Myawaddy town defense battalion and officers at battalion-commander level were forced to shelter near Friendship Bridge No. 2 on the Thai border—the junta can now be said to have regained many of the territories and bases it previously lost.
The military has reestablished control over the Kokko–Myawaddy Asia Highway, regained control of Kawkareik town, redeployed town defense forces near Myawaddy, and extended its dominance into areas close to the Thai–Myanmar border within Myawaddy Township. The most recent development is a report that the military instructed BGF battalions—those expected to transform into the Karen National Army (KNA)—to withdraw from Myawaddy town, ordered them not to attack the town defense battalion (LIB 275), and directed them to provide protection instead. The military reportedly also warned in advance of locations that would be targeted by airstrikes in retaliation if attacks occurred.
In recent months, the junta has carried out raids, seizures, demolitions, and explosions targeting buildings used by cyber-scam operations along the Thai–Myanmar border in Myawaddy Township. These operations included scam centers located in areas under BGF protection. According to reports, some of these raids were conducted without prior notification to or coordination with the BGF. These actions have, to some extent, damaged relations between the BGF and the military.
There are no fewer than five Karen ethnic armed organizations currently operating in Karen State. Among them, two have ceasefire agreements with the military, one operates as a Border Guard Force, and only one—the KNU/KNLA—is actively engaged in armed conflict with the junta.
The military has made use of the BGF under its command as a force controlling buffer areas when fighting the KNU/KNLA. The BGF has been deployed in military operations because of its familiarity with local terrain, language, and culture.
For its part, the BGF, while operating as a border guard force, generated revenue by providing territory and security services to cyber-scam syndicates. These funds were used to finance the armed organization itself and to enrich its leaders personally. Over time, this dependence on criminal enterprises for financial sustainability led to increasing international sanctions and a further decline in reputation.
Although the formation of the Karen National Army (KNA) was announced more than a year ago as an attempt to initiate change, only in recent weeks have KNA insignia and branding begun to be visibly adopted. This appears to have triggered retaliatory actions from the junta.
Among the reasons the coup regime has been able to restore military control and operational freedom over the past year and a half in and around Myawaddy—a key border trade hub and part of a major Southeast Asian connectivity route—is the divergence of interests among Karen armed organizations and the absence of a shared political position. Additional contributing factors include the slowing momentum of Operation 1027, ceasefires with two of the three northern armed organizations, and the enforcement of compulsory military service, which has helped replenish manpower.
Northern Shan State along the Chinese border and Myawaddy in Karen State along the Thai border are strategically vital areas when viewed in the context of Myanmar as a whole. Due to border trade, international transport routes, and economic corridors, the military is certain to continue efforts to control these regions.
An analysis of Karen armed organizations shows that while they share a strong overarching national identity, their individual objectives, interests, and political perspectives vary widely.
Unlike some other ethnic armed organizations that enforce strict centralized command structures and suppress splinter groups by force, Karen organizations have historically accepted fragmentation and allowed breakaway groups to exist independently. While this has certain positive aspects, the outcome from a military perspective has been a lack of cohesion, resulting in significant strategic and operational challenges.