Myanmar Spring Chronicle – December 26 Scene*
December 27, 2025
Two days before the coup regime’s election
After alleging that there were voting irregularities in the election held in early November 2020, the military seized power nearly three months later. Now, almost five years on, that same military is only two days away from holding another election.
On Sunday, December 28, the coup regime will hold the first phase of its election. Because there is no provision—such as in a constitution—requiring elections to be held simultaneously nationwide, the regime is citing security conditions and will conduct the vote in three rounds over about two months. The number of townships, towns, and villages where voting will be held is so small that it could be recorded as one of the most limited elections in Myanmar’s post-independence modern history.
Even during the civil war period from 1949 to 1952, elections were held. That civil-war election was conducted over nearly nine months, from June 1951 to April 1952, meaning it took longer than the process planned by the post-2021 coup authorities. At the time, parliament had 250 seats, but voting could be held for only 232 of them. Out of about 8 million eligible voters, only 1.5 million were able to vote—roughly 20% participation. And although elections were held for 232 seats, the territorial coverage was not proportionate; historical records describe situations where, due to the inability to guarantee security during the civil war, voting could be held in only 3 of 17 constituencies, for example.
Although the 2025–26 election resembles that civil-war-era election in being held amid conflict, it can be said that it will be conducted in an even smaller share of constituencies than the 1951–52 election. Under the current constitution and constituency definitions, out of 330 townships, elections cannot be held at all in 56 townships. If one counts townships where elections cannot be held partially, the number reaches 103, meaning that close to one-third of all townships will be only partially covered.
Rakhine State—where, in the 1951–52 election, voting could be held in only 3 out of 17 towns*—appears likely to be included in the *2025–26 election only at the level of 3 to at most 7 townships. The military is able to control only Kyaukphyu, Manaung, and Sittwe, and even if it claims to hold elections in Toungup, Thandwe, and Gwa, voting there would likely be possible only through remote voting arrangements.
These are two elections in Myanmar’s history that merit comparison: the 1951–52 election and the 2025–26 election.
Within Myanmar, political forces do not share a single position on the upcoming vote. Some politicians argue that the election is not free, that it is being conducted after discarding the 2020 results, and that it is run by an untrustworthy military regime—therefore it should be opposed and people should not support or participate. Others argue that even if it cannot be described as free and fair, amid the current civil war, military administration, and the wars that escalated after the coup, an election still represents one political method—one option among others—for seeking a political resolution.
Armed PDF groups that believe the military dictatorship can only be defeated through armed means view the election route as merely a process that legitimizes the coup regime, and they call for opposing the election and acting to prevent it from being held.
Some ethnic armed organizations have announced they will punish those who participate in the election process, while others have only urged people not to vote without going so far as to threaten penalties. However, since last year, when the regime began collecting census data and voter lists for the election, there have already been incidents in some areas where regime employees involved in collection were arrested or killed.
During the recent campaign period, there have also been bomb attacks on offices of political parties intending to run. Meanwhile, campaign activities of the military-backed USDP, led by retired generals and fully supportive of the military, have been provided full security by the army and police. In addition, the regime has been issuing laws said to “protect” the election and has arrested and jailed people who speak or write against it—actions that have been underway since recent months.
Internationally, there are governments and international organizations that do not recognize the election, while major powers and organizations such as the United Nations, ASEAN, and the European Union have issued a range of statements and positions. ASEAN, while not explicitly stating that it will not recognize the election, has emphasized the lack of conditions for an inclusive election and for a free and fair environment. India, China, and Russia, meanwhile, are countries providing assistance to the election process.
The view of countries that support or assist the election appears to be that it could help reduce the momentum of the civil war, create a degree of stability, and prevent refugees and displacement driven by intensifying conflict from crossing borders and affecting the wider region. Even if they do not see the regime as “good,” they may regard this as selecting the “best option among the worst.” Ideologically, this can be understood through a realist lens—accepting the junta-run election on pragmatic grounds.
Those who oppose the election are challenged by election-path supporters to propose an alternative course if the election method should be rejected. If armed struggle is put forward as the solution—a non-election alternative—then questions follow: is victory near, or can any time-bound horizon be credibly stated? Given the nature of Myanmar’s civil war—now spanning more than 70 years—and the cooperation and interest conflicts among dozens of ethnic armed organizations and the People’s Defense Forces formed after the 2021 coup, there are also questions about whether an armed-path victory will inevitably take a long time. The answers, clearly, are not simple or straightforward.
In short, the 2025–26 election is a political process through which the coup military seeks to implement the promise it made at the time of the coup, while arranging for the military-retired-generals-backed USDP to win a majority and re-emerge as an “elected government.” For the public living in areas under junta control, it is not wrong to say that—even if they do not wish to participate—they may still be pulled into the process.