Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from December 25*
(MoeMaKa) December 25, 2025
Reports say PDF forces are preparing to launch a town-seizure operation in Sinphyukyune, a town in Magway Region located on the west bank of the Ayeyarwady River, and have urged residents to evacuate. Some local reports also claim the junta, which currently controls the town, has been dropping dozens—possibly close to a hundred—bombs from the air. BBC Burmese reported that at least five residents were injured due to the air attacks.
The Salin Township People’s Defense Force warned that it plans to attack junta positions inside Sinphyukyune and urged residents to flee south toward Salin Township. Reports say Salin PaKaPha’s statement declared it would attack all military camps in Salin and Sinphyukyune and “ultimately seize” them.
Some reports add that there are landmines laid by PDF forces on the outskirts of town, and because of airstrikes and fighting in and around the town, people trying to leave must also watch out for mines. It is also reported that access roads in and out of town have been blocked by felled trees, forcing residents to remove the obstacles as they attempt to evacuate. Other reports say more residents are fleeing by water routes rather than by road.
In northern Magway—areas such as Pakokku Township, Myaing, Yesagyo, and on the west bank of the Ayeyarwady, places like Seikphyu and Salin*—PDF influence is considered strong. There are also reports of influence extending through connected villages toward the east bank, reaching as far as *Yenangyaung, Chauk, and Nyaung-U.
Areas linked to Bagan and Nyaung-U, which attract domestic and international tourism, are also described as places where PDFs and local defense forces (LPDFs) hold sway. LPDFs reportedly control portions of roads such as the Kyaukpadaung–Bagan/Nyaung-U road and parts of the Nyaung-U–Pakokku road. In some cases, there have also been reports of tourists being abducted around Bagan, Nyaung-U, and Popa.
Some observers argue that Salin PaKaPha publicly announcing in advance that it intends to seize Sinphyukyune could effectively give the enemy time to prepare. They also suggest that the junta may already understand the intent behind the recent moves by Salin PDF, and that even without such announcements, the junta would likely be able to infer which targets are being prioritized.
Sinphyukyune, Salin, and Pwintbyu lie along the corridor near the Pathein–Monywa highway on the west bank of the Ayeyarwady. They also sit on supply and communications routes that support junta bases such as Gote Gyi and Nat Yay Kan in Magway—positions that are under pressure from the Arakan Army (AA) advancing from the direction of the Rakhine Yoma and the Minbu–Ann side.
In Magway, places such as Nat Yay Kan and Gote Gyi, and in northwestern Bago, areas like Nyaung Kyo, are described as fronts where the junta is resisting AA offensives pushing in from the Rakhine side. The AA’s purpose, the piece argues, is to prevent the junta from being able to return to or operate inside Rakhine by pushing beyond Rakhine’s boundary.
At the same time, the AA may also be providing assistance and operational leadership, and coordinating offensives together with PDFs active in these areas. The article notes a pattern seen with groups such as the KIA in Kachin, the TNLA in northern Shan, and the AA in Rakhine: while capturing bases and towns in their core areas, they also coordinate with allied PDF forces in adjacent “buffer” areas and link those operations to their main campaigns.
This kind of strategy widens the number of fronts the junta must face and can also disrupt or cut supply routes—though it also requires greater financial resources and ammunition. The article points to the TNLA’s operations in places like Mogok, Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw, where it worked in alliance with local PDF forces under a unified strategy, and argues that the funding needs of such operations have contributed to intensified resource extraction (for example, the rush to mine gems in places like Mogok).
Finally, it suggests that if the junta has managed to secure some form of ceasefire understanding with the TNLA in northern Shan, that could allow it to reallocate part of its forces toward the west bank of the Ayeyarwady, increasing pressure there.