Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from December 30*
December 31, 2025
Events of 2025 – Politics and the Military (continued)
After reaching a ceasefire understanding with the MNDAA*—one of the two armed groups that grew significantly stronger in northern Shan during Operation 1027—the coup military launched offensives a few months later, as expected, to retake towns along the *Mandalay–Muse Union Highway that had been seized by the TNLA. After regaining Lashio without having to fight for it, the momentum of offensives in northern Shan increased. After retaking Taung Kham, then Nawnghkio, then Kyaukme, and then Hsipaw, the junta again obtained Mogok and Momeik through a ceasefire arrangement.
After securing Mogok and Momeik and signing the ceasefire agreement, instead of pushing forward further, it turned to reclaim areas behind the front. This can be seen in efforts to take control of the Mogok–Mandalay road corridor*—including *Madaya, Thabeikkyin, and Singu. As it gradually gained control of the east bank of the Irrawaddy, it appears to have intended to continue offensives into areas on the west bank*—inside *Sagaing Region. The reasons the military pushed into the Madaya–Singu–Thabeikkyin belt on the east bank may include two main objectives: cutting off tax revenues from gold-mining areas, and controlling a north–south supply and transport route.
In 2025, revolutionary armed groups ended up losing back some territories in northern Shan and upper Mandalay Region that they had captured and controlled during Operation 1027. In that sense, it can be said that Operation 1027—launched on October 27, 2023*—effectively came to an end after the MNDAA agreed to a ceasefire in *January 2025.
After looking at shifts in northern Shan in 2025, if we turn to Karenni State, Kayin State, and Tanintharyi Region: in Karenni, armed groups did not carry out major operations in 2025 aside from the battle to seize Hpasawng. The Loikaw city-seizure battle, launched on November 11, 2023, continued into late 2024 conditions, and by mid-to-late 2025 the military was mainly seen trying gradually to reassert control over Demoso and Pekon.
In Kayin State, the coup military regained control of the Thingannyinaung strategic bases and the Asia Highway corridor, which the KNU/KNLA had held for nearly a year, and it also managed to reassert control over Myawaddy. Along the Thai border, however, the KNU/KNLA were also seen capturing one junta outpost after another. The BGF, which had remained in-between during much of the 2024 confrontation between the KNU/KNLA and the military, moved back closer to the junta after international pressure intensified regarding crackdowns on online-scam networks, and it issued a statement saying it would help with the election. In early 2025, as China increased pressure to crack down on scam syndicates operating in Myawaddy Township on the Thai–Myanmar border, it became harder for the BGF and the DKBA to maintain an independent stance, pushing them into a situation where they had to rely again on the military.
As international attention focused on scam operations in Myawaddy Township, armed actors operating in the area came under mounting pressure over how far they would go in dismantling or demonstrating a crackdown on those businesses. The coup military, seemingly learning from the reputational damage it suffered in northern Shan’s Kokang area—where military-appointed Kokang self-administration leaders and security forces were implicated in scam operations—was seen attempting to ease pressure from China and other countries by carrying out visible actions such as demolishing buildings linked to scam gangs in Myawaddy. The military also appears to understand well that by late 2023 the growth of scam syndicates in northern Shan had been framed internationally as a political problem. Which armed organizations will ultimately be hit hardest by the scam issue, however, may still be too early to conclude.
In Tanintharyi Region, the KNU/KNLA were seen capturing some junta outposts along the Thai border during 2025. For PDF forces active in Tanintharyi, there were no visible city- or territory-seizure campaigns, nor were there major retreats of the kind seen elsewhere.
In Myanmar’s west, Rakhine State saw the AA seize large parts of the state in 2025, and fighting continued throughout the year in adjacent areas—parts of Ayeyarwady Region, the western side of Bago Region, and western Magway Region. After the AA captured Gwa Township at the southernmost end of Rakhine at the end of 2024, it gradually pressed toward the Ayeyarwady border, including Yegyi and Thabaung townships. Fighting continued all year in these areas, and clashes also occurred along the Taungup–Pandaung road, around the Rakhine Yoma and the Bago borderlands. Further north, along the Minbu–Ann road, the AA carried out months-long offensives against the Natyekan strategic base; as of now, Natyekan has not yet fallen, but AA advances have reached the point where they could threaten defense-related factories in western Magway. The forces fighting on these fronts were not AA units alone: in Ayeyarwady, local PDF units fought jointly; in Bago and Magway, PDF battalions from those regions also participated in similar ways. Inside Rakhine State itself, only two towns under military control remained: the state capital Sittwe, and Kyaukphyu, where China-backed projects are located, including the deep-sea port and the oil-and-gas pipelines. Fighting also occurred in Kyaukphyu Township during 2025.
In the northern part of Rakhine—across Chin State, parts of Sagaing, and northern Magway*—fighting also took place throughout the year. The military was seen preparing from mid-2025 and launching later offensives to retake *Falam, one of the towns held by Chin armed groups. The military was only able to retain control of Tedim and Hakha. Because Chin State does not produce significant natural resources and is not positioned on a major strategic corridor, the coup military has not been seen launching large-scale offensives there with heavy concentrations of force.
In Myanmar’s far north, Kachin State saw two particularly notable military developments this year: the Bhamo city-seizure battle, which has now been underway for a year without a decisive victory for either side, and the military’s ability to re-enter parts of the Hpakant area. The KIA’s Bhamo offensive, which began in December 2024, had pinned down the junta for roughly six months. But in the middle of the rainy season, after a military flotilla carrying personnel, weapons, ammunition, and supplies moved upriver along the Irrawaddy and arrived, the balance of the Bhamo battle shifted somewhat. From mid–rainy season through the end of this year, the battle for Bhamo remains unresolved, with neither side achieving a clear win.
Beyond the battle situations described above—Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, northern Shan, Karenni, Kayin, Tanintharyi, Bago, Mandalay, and Magway—other regions such as southern Shan, eastern Bago, Naypyidaw, Yangon, and Mon State did not, in this year, see especially notable large-scale territorial gains or losses.
(To be continued.)Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from December 30*
December 31, 2025
Events of 2025 – Politics and the Military (continued)
After reaching a ceasefire understanding with the MNDAA*—one of the two armed groups that grew significantly stronger in northern Shan during Operation 1027—the coup military launched offensives a few months later, as expected, to retake towns along the *Mandalay–Muse Union Highway that had been seized by the TNLA. After regaining Lashio without having to fight for it, the momentum of offensives in northern Shan increased. After retaking Taung Kham, then Nawnghkio, then Kyaukme, and then Hsipaw, the junta again obtained Mogok and Momeik through a ceasefire arrangement.
After securing Mogok and Momeik and signing the ceasefire agreement, instead of pushing forward further, it turned to reclaim areas behind the front. This can be seen in efforts to take control of the Mogok–Mandalay road corridor*—including *Madaya, Thabeikkyin, and Singu. As it gradually gained control of the east bank of the Irrawaddy, it appears to have intended to continue offensives into areas on the west bank*—inside *Sagaing Region. The reasons the military pushed into the Madaya–Singu–Thabeikkyin belt on the east bank may include two main objectives: cutting off tax revenues from gold-mining areas, and controlling a north–south supply and transport route.
In 2025, revolutionary armed groups ended up losing back some territories in northern Shan and upper Mandalay Region that they had captured and controlled during Operation 1027. In that sense, it can be said that Operation 1027—launched on October 27, 2023*—effectively came to an end after the MNDAA agreed to a ceasefire in *January 2025.
After looking at shifts in northern Shan in 2025, if we turn to Karenni State, Kayin State, and Tanintharyi Region: in Karenni, armed groups did not carry out major operations in 2025 aside from the battle to seize Hpasawng. The Loikaw city-seizure battle, launched on November 11, 2023, continued into late 2024 conditions, and by mid-to-late 2025 the military was mainly seen trying gradually to reassert control over Demoso and Pekon.
In Kayin State, the coup military regained control of the Thingannyinaung strategic bases and the Asia Highway corridor, which the KNU/KNLA had held for nearly a year, and it also managed to reassert control over Myawaddy. Along the Thai border, however, the KNU/KNLA were also seen capturing one junta outpost after another. The BGF, which had remained in-between during much of the 2024 confrontation between the KNU/KNLA and the military, moved back closer to the junta after international pressure intensified regarding crackdowns on online-scam networks, and it issued a statement saying it would help with the election. In early 2025, as China increased pressure to crack down on scam syndicates operating in Myawaddy Township on the Thai–Myanmar border, it became harder for the BGF and the DKBA to maintain an independent stance, pushing them into a situation where they had to rely again on the military.
As international attention focused on scam operations in Myawaddy Township, armed actors operating in the area came under mounting pressure over how far they would go in dismantling or demonstrating a crackdown on those businesses. The coup military, seemingly learning from the reputational damage it suffered in northern Shan’s Kokang area—where military-appointed Kokang self-administration leaders and security forces were implicated in scam operations—was seen attempting to ease pressure from China and other countries by carrying out visible actions such as demolishing buildings linked to scam gangs in Myawaddy. The military also appears to understand well that by late 2023 the growth of scam syndicates in northern Shan had been framed internationally as a political problem. Which armed organizations will ultimately be hit hardest by the scam issue, however, may still be too early to conclude.
In Tanintharyi Region, the KNU/KNLA were seen capturing some junta outposts along the Thai border during 2025. For PDF forces active in Tanintharyi, there were no visible city- or territory-seizure campaigns, nor were there major retreats of the kind seen elsewhere.
In Myanmar’s west, Rakhine State saw the AA seize large parts of the state in 2025, and fighting continued throughout the year in adjacent areas—parts of Ayeyarwady Region, the western side of Bago Region, and western Magway Region. After the AA captured Gwa Township at the southernmost end of Rakhine at the end of 2024, it gradually pressed toward the Ayeyarwady border, including Yegyi and Thabaung townships. Fighting continued all year in these areas, and clashes also occurred along the Taungup–Pandaung road, around the Rakhine Yoma and the Bago borderlands. Further north, along the Minbu–Ann road, the AA carried out months-long offensives against the Natyekan strategic base; as of now, Natyekan has not yet fallen, but AA advances have reached the point where they could threaten defense-related factories in western Magway. The forces fighting on these fronts were not AA units alone: in Ayeyarwady, local PDF units fought jointly; in Bago and Magway, PDF battalions from those regions also participated in similar ways. Inside Rakhine State itself, only two towns under military control remained: the state capital Sittwe, and Kyaukphyu, where China-backed projects are located, including the deep-sea port and the oil-and-gas pipelines. Fighting also occurred in Kyaukphyu Township during 2025.
In the northern part of Rakhine—across Chin State, parts of Sagaing, and northern Magway*—fighting also took place throughout the year. The military was seen preparing from mid-2025 and launching later offensives to retake *Falam, one of the towns held by Chin armed groups. The military was only able to retain control of Tedim and Hakha. Because Chin State does not produce significant natural resources and is not positioned on a major strategic corridor, the coup military has not been seen launching large-scale offensives there with heavy concentrations of force.
In Myanmar’s far north, Kachin State saw two particularly notable military developments this year: the Bhamo city-seizure battle, which has now been underway for a year without a decisive victory for either side, and the military’s ability to re-enter parts of the Hpakant area. The KIA’s Bhamo offensive, which began in December 2024, had pinned down the junta for roughly six months. But in the middle of the rainy season, after a military flotilla carrying personnel, weapons, ammunition, and supplies moved upriver along the Irrawaddy and arrived, the balance of the Bhamo battle shifted somewhat. From mid–rainy season through the end of this year, the battle for Bhamo remains unresolved, with neither side achieving a clear win.
Beyond the battle situations described above—Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, northern Shan, Karenni, Kayin, Tanintharyi, Bago, Mandalay, and Magway—other regions such as southern Shan, eastern Bago, Naypyidaw, Yangon, and Mon State did not, in this year, see especially notable large-scale territorial gains or losses.
(To be continued.)