Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from December 28*
December 29, 2025
An election that can be held in less than half the country: Myanmar’s election and the near-term outlook
Because it is winter and the sun has not fully risen even by 6 a.m., social media and some news outlets showed that in certain parts of Myanmar, people were already at polling stations early in the morning. Some government employees in Naypyidaw said they were instructed to go vote as civil servants under the military administration, then take a phone photo of the proof of voting—an inked finger—and report it to their superiors. Since not voting could potentially affect their jobs, it is possible that many went to vote from very early in the morning.
In some villages within areas controlled by the military, it is also said that people ended up voting because of threats that anyone who did not vote would be recorded and could be punished with imprisonment. In Mandalay, figures released by the election commission under military control claimed that more than 60% of eligible voters cast ballots. This suggests that in cities, the “don’t vote” movement ended up failing under a climate of fear—although those numbers may also be exaggerated.
Revolutionary forces urged the public not to vote, warning that voting would effectively legitimize the coup military and amount to granting it a “legal license to kill.” However, for civilians living under coup rule—without justice or freedom—it is also difficult to participate fully in an anti-election campaign or a boycott. People have seen and heard that those calling for a boycott or urging people not to vote are being arrested under “election protection” laws and sentenced to up to seven years in prison, making it difficult for the public to organize and campaign openly and visibly against voting.
Because of the coup military’s threats and the many ways it can harass and punish people, residents living in military-controlled areas face major obstacles to carrying out “don’t vote” organizing or advocacy.
PDF forces have also been trying to do whatever they can to boycott, disrupt, and oppose the election. In Butalin, Sagaing Region, PDF units launched attacks early in the morning of December 28 against military positions inside the town. In Dawei, Tanintharyi Region, reports said there were explosions and drone-bomb attacks both the day before election day and on election day itself.
Early on the morning the election was to be held, four rockets were fired at Mandalay. One reportedly struck a residential neighborhood in Aungmyaythazan Township, injuring a woman who was asleep at home so severely that she suffered a traumatic leg amputation.
In Myawaddy, Kayin State, on the night before the election, a powerful bomb explosion near the USDP party office reportedly killed one woman and injured around ten people. The target was believed to be the USDP office, and nearby homes suffered major damage. People suspected it was an attack using a high-explosive military-type bomb rather than a simple homemade device.
With only three days left before the end of 2025, how much can an election held at this time affect Myanmar’s future? Even though there are differing views internationally—whether the election is legitimate or not, whether it should be recognized or not—what matters more than international attitudes are the positions and reactions of domestic political and military forces.
For the coup military, one encouraging factor is that two powerful neighboring countries—China and India—have shown support for the election process. These major powers have treated the coup administration as a de facto government, and their sales of arms and military/security technologies function as significant support for the military authorities. Their view of the election process as a “positive development” for Myanmar’s political trajectory is diplomatically negative for revolutionary forces and other political/military groups opposing the military.
On December 28, delegations from China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and India were reportedly sent to observe the first phase of the election. Some embassies did not dispatch separate delegations, but diplomats from Yangon-based embassies observed the election process. ASEAN, the 11-member regional bloc of which Myanmar is a member, did not send a delegation. Because ASEAN believes there has not been satisfactory progress on implementing the Five-Point Consensus, it has for more than four years decided not to allow politically appointed representatives from Myanmar to attend its meetings.
This election is being held in three phases, with authorities citing an insufficient number of security personnel. They have announced that within one month, voting will be conducted by dividing locations into three designated parts. Initially, the third phase was set for February 11, but it was recently moved forward by about two weeks to January 25. Since parliament must be convened within 90 days after the third phase, it can be estimated that parliament would be convened around April 28.
A few days after that, they would select a president and form a government. This could lead to a government emerging in May—nominally called an “elected government,” but in practice led by recently retired former generals.
In the eyes of the international community, this would likely be seen only as a government produced by an election in which not all political forces could participate—an election lacking fairness and freedom—and a government led by former generals who are “whitewashing” the coup. But that does not automatically mean the international community would recognize the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) either. For recognition, a state is generally expected to possess key attributes such as a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and sovereignty. Even if some of these elements are present, efforts to gain recognition are more likely to succeed only when all four are fully met.
At present, one could say the situation is such that, along the election path being dragged forward by the military, Myanmar’s public and anti-military forces—though unwilling—have nonetheless been compelled to move along it to some extent.