Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 12 Overview
(MoeMaKa, November 13, 2025)
U.S. sanctions 4 DKBA leaders
In recent months, reports about online fraud syndicates along the Thailand–Myanmar border have continued to surface, and the governments and armed groups connected to them have begun responding. The latest development is that the United States has imposed sanctions on four leaders of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), along with a Thai national.
The U.S. had previously sanctioned some BGF (Border Guard Force) leaders for protecting and assisting online scamming operations. This time, major DKBA figures were targeted: Saw Stee, Saw Sein Win, Saw San Aung, and Sai Hla Kyaw. In addition, two Thailand-based companies linked to DKBA activities and one Thai national were also sanctioned.
For now, these U.S. sanctions may not have an immediate, major impact on the DKBA leaders themselves. What matters more is how Thailand, a U.S. ally, might increase pressure on the DKBA. Countries most harmed by these crimes—China, the United States, neighboring states whose citizens are lured, trafficked, and forced to work, and other nations worldwide—want to push Myanmar-based scam operations and their armed protectors to shut down.
However, because these scams generate billions of dollars, the profits are enjoyed by scam bosses, the armed groups that provide them protection, and corrupt law-enforcement and bureaucratic actors in the relevant countries who facilitate illicit businesses. As a result, the networks are looking for ways to keep the operations alive in some form.
To ease international pressure, we’ve seen moves such as token arrests and raids, tipping off ringleaders to relocate, ultimately allowing certain sites to be dismantled, and releasing trafficked “modern slaves” and repatriating them.
After international pressure in October 2023 to crack down on scam syndicates in northern Shan State, many compounds there were emptied, and a nearly year-long war flared in the region. The main concentration of online scam hubs then shifted to the Thailand–Myanmar border in Karen State.
Early in 2025, the abduction of a well-known Chinese actor to a scam compound in Myawaddy Township heightened Chinese pressure, prompting Thailand to cooperate more closely with China to suppress scam operations. While Myanmar armed groups play the dominant role on the Myanmar side, on the Thai side there has been complicity from police, officials, and some politicians who benefited from infrastructure, telecoms, electricity, and money-laundering channels that kept the scam industry running smoothly.
Scam compounds thrive where there is a steady flow of labor (including trafficked foreigners), accessible communications and banking, and easy cross-border movement—conditions that match Myawaddy. In earlier decades, these armed groups survived on drug trafficking and smuggling; over the last 7–8 years, they shifted toward casinos and online fraud (“kyar-phyant”/pig-butchering scams).
Throughout Myanmar’s decades-long civil war, the military has often split and co-opted ethnic armed groups to balance power—allowing factions like DKBA to operate with latitude. Splintered from the KNU in the 1990s, the DKBA has repeatedly changed names, split and re-merged over two-plus decades. The largest splinter led by Saw Chit Thu grew stronger than others, enjoyed more manpower and arms, and for over a decade served as a BGF under Myanmar army command—before rebranding in 2024 as the Karen National Army following the coup.
The DKBA does not possess sufficient strength to guarantee the junta’s security on its own. With growing international sanctions and pressure, it is likely to maintain ties with the junta carefully, positioning itself to be useful whenever the military regime needs assistance.