Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 21 View
(MoeMaKa, November 22, 2025)
TNLA, MDY PDF, and the Situation in Mogok, Momeik, and Upper Mandalay Region
In recent days, much of the news has centered on the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and its decision to withdraw from Mogok and Momeik, following its ceasefire agreement with the junta. Questions now dominate public discussion: How exactly will TNLA withdraw? Will the towns be handed back to the junta? What will happen to MDY PDF (Mandalay People’s Defense Forces) operating jointly with TNLA in those areas?
At the October meeting in Kunming, China, TNLA and the junta agreed to a ceasefire. The key points included returning the two occupied towns and halting airstrikes. Since then, the main public curiosity has been: how will this withdrawal take shape?
If TNLA simply pulls out, PDF units plan to remain in position, maintaining defense lines to prevent junta re-entry. However, if TNLA’s withdrawal involves formally transferring control to the junta, as occurred when MNDAA handed over Lashio, tensions could arise between TNLA and the PDFs that had fought alongside it.
Reports emerged this week that PDF and TNLA representatives met in Namtu and Namhsan to discuss the details of the Mogok and Momeik handover. Among the two, Mogok is viewed as strategically and economically more vital—given its gem mines—so many are determined to defend it at all costs.
For TNLA, maintaining ceasefire commitments with the junta may now outweigh alliance obligations to PDFs. The decision to cease hostilities seems to have been made without consulting all PDF allies, prioritizing TNLA’s own military and political survival.
For PDF allies that once fought alongside TNLA in Kyaukme, Naungcho, and Hsipaw, watching Mogok and Momeik fall back under junta control is difficult. Yet directly defying TNLA’s ceasefire would risk splitting the alliance. Thus, many PDFs find themselves in an impossible situation — unable to fight, but unwilling to accept the loss.
The fate of the two towns will likely be settled by the end of this month. MDY PDF, the Mogok Defense Force, and other armed groups must now decide whether to hold their ground or withdraw alongside TNLA.
During MNDAA’s January handover of Lashio, such internal friction did not occur — so why is it happening now? The answer may lie in differing contexts: the relationship between MNDAA and its allied PDFs was politically distinct from the TNLA–PDF partnership.
Among the broader public, TNLA’s ceasefire—following MNDAA’s earlier deal—has deepened distrust toward ethnic armed groups. Many pro-revolution citizens see the truces as betrayals, believing the junta must be defeated militarily to the end. To them, “tactical ceasefires” are hard to accept.
Yet, Myanmar’s history shows that ethnic armed groups have periodically paused fighting, even while continuing their struggles for autonomy. After 1989, many agreed to ceasefires under the promise of “development projects.” Understanding those patterns in the context of the current revolution, however, remains difficult for many who want a total victory over dictatorship.
Complicating the situation further, Mogok, though geographically part of Shan State, is administratively within Mandalay Region. While that issue unfolds, MDY PDF itself has faced internal upheaval: two of its senior leaders were detained by the NUG’s Ministry of Defense for alleged misuse of funds and property.
On November 21, MDY PDF publicly confirmed that its Head of Military Affairs, Ko Montine, and Head of Finance, Ko Naing Gyi, were arrested for failing to return unit-owned assets. Some reports claim their arrest was tied to confusion over MDY PDF’s recent placement under NUG’s official military command structure.
The MDY PDF had previously been one of the strongest forces in central Myanmar, active in Mandalay, Thabeikkyin, Madaya, and Singu. Whether the detentions stemmed from financial misconduct or internal disputes, such incidents risk damaging public trust in the revolutionary movement.
The timing is particularly sensitive: just as the two northern towns may revert to junta hands, one of the key Mandalay-based resistance groups is facing internal turmoil. For the revolution, these are not encouraging signs.