Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 25 Dispatch
(MoeMaKa), November 26, 2025
The fight against scam compounds: increasingly entangled with war and politics
The “tiger-release” scam networks (online scam compounds) along the Thai–Myanmar border can broadly be seen as a cross-border criminal enterprise that torments both neighboring countries and the wider international community, and as one of the toxic side-effects spawned by Myanmar’s long-running civil war.
The masterminds behind these cross-border fraud operations, which move money across borders and deceive people online, are largely Chinese nationals. They seek out countries in the region where the rule of law is weak and where there are armed groups or power centers that can protect them, and then establish bases there to run their scam businesses.
In Southeast Asia, Myanmar and Cambodia have become fertile ground for these operations. Sihanoukville in Cambodia, northern Shan State on Myanmar’s border with China, and Karen State along the Thai–Myanmar border have all turned into hubs for these transnational scam syndicates.
In Cambodia, there may be no civil war, but elements within the government profit from and protect these operations. In Myanmar, by contrast, civil war has provided an environment in which armed groups – including some People’s Defense Forces and other armed actors with little or no clear political agenda – protect scam operations to fund their forces. They block reporters and investigators from entering, and run the fraud compounds under the cover of “casinos” and entertainment complexes.
These are the structural conditions that explain why the scam business (known locally as kyar-phyan, “tiger release”) has taken root in these particular countries and regions.
Now, however, powerful countries whose citizens are being victimized – and countries like China, which is home both to perpetrators and victims – are under pressure to protect their nationals and reputations. As a result, they are pressing the governments of the countries concerned to crack down on these operations.
Countries like Thailand, which provide the infrastructure the scams rely on – internet, electricity, and transit routes – are also facing pressure from major powers to cooperate in suppression efforts.
For Myanmar, the period when scam syndicates flourished most vigorously overlaps with a time of intense armed conflict nationwide. Rather than being a coincidence, this likely reflects the fact that warring actors, under severe financial strain, became increasingly dependent on protecting scam compounds in exchange for cash.
During Operation 1027, three ethnic armed organizations operating in northern Shan State linked two objectives: cracking down on scam syndicates and seizing territory from the junta. By doing so, they sought and received backing from China. Northern Shan State has since seen major shifts in territorial control, and scam operations have visibly declined there.
After that, the main centers of scam activity shifted to Myawaddy Township on the Thai–Myanmar border and to Three Pagodas Pass in Mon State. There, high-rise complexes sprang up in border areas, functioning like mini-cities full of restaurants, KTVs, and other services – criminal economies that continued to operate without serious disruption up until early this year.
Early this year, a Chinese actor who was lured to the border and forced to work and endure torture in a scam compound drew widespread attention to the scam syndicates along the Thai–Myanmar border.
China – as both a source of scam operators and of victims – has been pressuring Thailand in particular, since Thailand is the main transit route and the provider of key services such as internet and electricity for the compounds.
By contrast, Myanmar’s junta has largely escaped direct, heavy pressure, because BGF and DKBA – the groups protecting the scam operations – are not formally under its command structure. This has allowed it to avoid being treated as the directly responsible party in international pressure campaigns.
Armed groups that protect the scam compounds have responded to pressure from the international community and from Thailand by staging partial crackdowns, then quietly resuming operations. This has been the pattern up until the last few months.
For these armed groups, the income from protecting scam compounds is enormous – far beyond what they earn from taxing drug trafficking, resource extraction, or border trade. That is why there has been no serious intent to dismantle the scam business entirely. During military operations, they may stage arrests or transfers up to a certain level, but once things calm down, they either restart in the same locations or relocate and continue operating under protection.
What is new this time is that the junta itself – whose relations with BGF have cooled since last year – and the KNU have entered the scam-crackdown arena. Over the past six to seven years, BGF has been deeply involved in protecting scam operations. Junta leaders know very well how that protection worked and how the money flowed; they may also have shared in the profits to some extent. But because they were not directly running the compounds themselves, they have been able to avoid being singled out internationally as the primary responsible criminal organization.
Now, however, the junta has begun attacking BGF-linked compounds without regard for BGF’s interests, destroying buildings in raids. At the same time, in recent days the KNU has stormed scam compounds in Min Let Pan Village that had been under DKBA protection, detaining both the scam organizers and the forced laborers, and publicly calling on foreign governments to cooperate in investigations.
Against this backdrop, questions arise:
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How will the relationship between the junta and BGF evolve in the course of these scam-suppression operations?
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How will ties between DKBA and KNU, and between KNU and BGF, change?
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What impact will all this have on the wider political and military landscape?
We are now seeing a situation in which armed groups that once protected criminal enterprises for their own survival are having to recalibrate their positions and adjust the protection they offer, calculating military and political interests as scam syndicates are targeted.
In turn, the campaign against scam compounds is beginning to reshape the web of relationships among armed actors in the borderlands – with potential consequences far beyond the criminal economy itself.