Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 16 View
(MoeMaKa) November 17, 2025
MNDAA–Junta relations; China’s region-wide push on scam syndicates (“kyar-phyant”)
After the routine coordination meeting between the junta and the Kokang armed group MNDAA—currently in a ceasefire with the junta—held in Lashio on November 11, both sides began blocking roads for several days: they closed the bridge on the Union Highway through Hsipaw, halting traffic, and also shut the Main Rway–Hoya road and the Namlan road from both directions.
This reciprocal road-closure appears to stem from the junta’s request at the Nov. 11 meeting for MNDAA troops to withdraw from the Union Highway corridor, which MNDAA reportedly refused.
As of now, neither MNDAA nor the junta has issued statements about the situation. While reports circulated that the junta set November 20 as a deadline for MNDAA to vacate the Union Highway, on November 16 new reports emerged that MNDAA released more than 200 junta POWs captured during the 2023–2024 “Operation 1027” campaigns. Given today’s tensions, this mass release raises the question of whether a new understanding has been reached, though that is still unclear.
Even before a ceasefire was reached, MNDAA had at times released prisoners—e.g., after taking Chinshwehaw and Laukkai, senior officers were freed via UWSA’s mediation; in August 2024 nearly 800 soldiers and family members were released; more than 200 POWs were freed in December 2024; and this June about 45 police and soldiers were also released.
Although staggered releases have occurred over the past year, freeing 200-plus POWs amid the present standoff may or may not be directly linked to current talks; it’s too early to say.
With ceasefires now in place with two of the three main forces of Operation 1027—and with apparent Chinese backing—the junta seems to be probing each group in turn and pushing to reassert control over the strategic Mandalay–Lashio–Muse Union Highway, vital not only for border trade but also for military logistics and territorial control. During Operation 1027, segments of this highway were cut and the army even lost Lashio and eastern/northeastern regional HQs.
Learning from that, the military now appears intent on reclaiming and segmenting control of the highway—applying military pressure and diplomatic tactics step by step to consolidate it.
A second topic dominating recent weeks is the transnational online scamming syndicates (“kyar-phyant”) based in Myanmar’s Myawaddy area and the strategies of China and the U.S.
Since early this year, China has pressed Thailand and Myanmar to suppress these operations. While its pressure on the junta is less publicly visible, Beijing has coordinated closely with Thailand—the main transit route for trafficked victims—sending minister-level officials as far as Mae Sot and border points. Early in 2025, China repatriated thousands of its nationals who fled scam compounds, and now, in late 2025, a “second-wave” crackdown appears to be accelerating.
Because many ringleaders and victims are Chinese nationals, China has become a leading actor in scam suppression. Recently, the U.S. and U.K. moved as well—imposing restrictions on Chinese national Chen Zhi of Cambodia’s Prince Group, and the U.S. sanctioned four DKBA leaders over Myanmar–Thailand border scam operations. Washington also announced the formation of a Southeast Asia anti-scam task force.
These steps raise questions: Is the U.S. now entering scam suppression directly, and will this become an arena of competition with China?
In parallel, China is convening a regional anti-scam cooperation mechanism with Southeast Asian countries where the syndicates are based—Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—seemingly moving faster than the U.S.
China clearly does not want U.S. influence to expand over regional anti-scam efforts. How these two great powers project influence under the banner of combating “kyar-phyant,” and how that, in turn, impacts the region—especially Myanmar, which has provided ground for these syndicates—has become a key question, including its effects on Myanmar’s ongoing civil war.