Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 20 View
(MoeMaKa, November 21, 2025)
Impact of the U.S. Special Task Force and Congressional Hearing on Online Scam Centers on the Myanmar Military
In recent weeks, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Chen Zhi, a Chinese-born Cambodian businessman who heads the Prince Group conglomerate. He was accused of crypto-currency and online financial scams, and U.S. authorities reportedly seized USD 14 billion worth of Bitcoin linked to his operations.
A few weeks later, the U.S. sanctioned four leaders of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), an armed group active along the Thai–Myanmar border, for their involvement in online scam syndicates (known locally as Kyar Phyant operations).
Following those actions, Washington announced the creation of a Scam Center Strike Force (SCSF). This special task force brings together representatives from the Department of Justice, FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, U.S. Secret Service, Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the State Department. Its stated mission is to combat transnational cyber-fraud syndicates in Southeast Asia that target U.S. citizens.
Soon after that announcement, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittees on East Asia–Pacific Affairs and South Asia held a hearing on Myanmar, titled:
“A Strategy with No Exit: Myanmar’s Endless Crisis and the U.S.’s Limited Options.”
All these developments have unfolded within the past one to two months.
The Myanmar junta’s spokesperson responded to the formation of the SCSF, saying that while the stated purpose was anti-fraud enforcement, there might be a “hidden agenda” behind it—reflecting the junta’s nervous scrutiny of every American move in the region.
While the sanctions against Chen Zhi and his Cambodia-based operations are not directly related to Myanmar, the U.S. crackdown on crypto-linked online fraud across the Thai–Myanmar border touches the junta’s backyard. Yet, it likely has little immediate impact on Myanmar’s military itself—just as sanctioning DKBA leaders may not affect the regime in a significant way.
Still, the creation of the SCSF has fueled speculation over whether the U.S. might use the online-scam crisis as a new entry point to engage with, or pressure, regional governments—including Myanmar. The timing of the congressional hearing suggests this could become part of a broader reassessment of U.S. Myanmar policy.
However, congressional hearings rarely translate directly into shifts in executive policy. Even the Burma Act, passed and signed into law under the previous administration, has seen limited implementation in practice.
The U.S. government will undoubtedly take serious action against scams that defraud its citizens—but its broader approach in Asia is guided by geopolitical competition with China, not just human rights or democracy promotion. Therefore, it remains uncertain whether anti-scam initiatives will extend to confronting the junta’s human-rights abuses or war crimes.
Politically, the current U.S. administration operates with limited congressional influence. With the departure of figures such as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, long an advocate for Myanmar democracy, voices for Myanmar within Washington have weakened. This makes sweeping policy changes unlikely.
In the grand U.S.–China rivalry, Myanmar and Thailand are not yet seen as critical battlegrounds. The major fronts of competition are in the South China Sea and Taiwan, not in the fight against scam centers along the Thai–Myanmar border.
Meanwhile, Thailand, once a close U.S. military and economic ally, has drawn closer to China in recent years—and is cooperating more with Beijing than Washington on the cyber-scam issue. Just recently, the Chinese ringleader She Zhijiang (She Kailiang), detained for nearly three years, was extradited from Thailand to China.
Thus, while the U.S. entry into Southeast Asia’s anti-scam campaign could theoretically open a channel for involvement in Myanmar affairs, the likelihood remains low. The junta, for its part, is watching these developments closely, wary that events with potentially large international ripple effects could one day shift its own fate.