Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 22 View
(MoeMaKa, November 23, 2025)
Crackdown on “Kyar Phyant” Operations along the Thai–Myanmar Border and its Geopolitical Implications
The crackdown on online scam syndicates (known locally as Kyar Phyant) in Myawaddy Township, along the Thai–Myanmar border, is now being jointly executed by the junta, the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF/KNA), and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) — whether for show or genuine intent. These armed groups, which had previously provided protection for the scam operations, are now conducting raids and clearance operations against them.
Earlier this year, in February and March 2025, the junta and Thai authorities coordinated the first wave of arrests, deporting some suspects. Yet the crackdown paused afterward, and the scam networks continued to thrive. The true scale of these syndicates — their manpower and total operators — is known only to the BGF/KNA and DKBA, which had long been their protectors.
Asked why these border armed groups had shielded the scam operations, the short answer is money. Before the rise of these criminal enterprises, such groups survived through smuggling, extortion, and illicit trade. Exactly when and how they entered the scam business is unclear — only intelligence agencies and those involved would know.
The Shwe Kokko New City Project, approved by Myanmar’s Investment Commission in 2018 as a Special Economic Zone, was originally promoted as a joint venture between the Myanmar Yatai Company and the BGF under Saw Chit Thu, which held 20% ownership. At the time, it was marketed as a tourism and casino hub targeting international visitors, with no sign of the future online fraud industry. The project’s scale put it under Union government jurisdiction, rather than the Karen State government.
By early 2024, during the junta’s major losses in Operation 1027, Saw Chit Thu announced that his BGF had renamed itself the Karen National Army (KNA) and would no longer accept support from the junta. This move came as the regime’s troops lost multiple bases near Thingannyinaung and even temporarily lost Myawaddy itself.
Now, with international outrage over forced labor, torture, and cyber-slavery within scam compounds, China has pressured Thailand to cut electricity, internet, and cross-border access to Myawaddy scam zones. The Thai government, facing both Chinese pressure and global embarrassment, has restricted utilities and tightened law enforcement against these operations.
For the junta, which has distanced itself from the BGF/KNA since their split, this crackdown conveniently allows it to escape direct blame, claiming it no longer controls the area.
In 2025, however, both China and the United States have declared their intent to eliminate transnational scam networks as part of broader strategic agendas. The U.S. recently sanctioned four DKBA leaders, formed a Scam Center Strike Force (SCSF), and increased focus on these crimes along the Thai–Myanmar border.
China, for its part, sees the issue as a domestic security threat, since many syndicate leaders are Chinese nationals, and large numbers of scam victims are also Chinese citizens. Beijing has thus legitimate grounds to pressure both Thailand and Myanmar for stronger enforcement.
For Thailand, long a U.S. military ally but now economically closer to China, the current environment requires balancing both powers — cooperating simultaneously with Washington’s anti-fraud agenda and Beijing’s crackdowns.
For the Myanmar junta, keeping its distance from the BGF has turned out to be a strategic advantage, allowing it to claim non-involvement while watching events unfold. Some reports even suggest that junta units were not fully briefed on recent BGF operations in Shwe Kokko.
Regional analysts note parallels between the scam crackdown and Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, speculating that if foreign powers supply funds and arms to local ethnic forces to suppress scam syndicates, it could resemble the earlier offensives against the junta.
Still, it is too soon to tell whether this anti-scam campaign will yield any tangible benefit for anti-junta resistance forces in the region. For now, it remains primarily a geopolitical maneuver — one in which global powers are competing for influence on the Thai–Myanmar frontier.