Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 26 Dispatch
(MoeMaKa) November 27, 2025
Amnesty for those arrested under Political Section 505-A and related warrants
The military council announced in its 8 p.m. news broadcast on November 26 that:
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5,580 people who had been issued arrest warrants, had cases opened against them, or were under trial under Section 505-A (a new section, separate from the existing Section 505(a) of the Penal Code) have had their cases closed and been granted amnesty;
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726 people currently serving prison sentences solely under Section 505-A have also been released; and
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more than 2,300 others, who were convicted under Section 505-A in combination with other charges, have had the 505-A portion of their sentences reduced or remitted.
Two weeks after the coup in 2021, on February 14, the junta inserted a new article, Section 505-A, into the Penal Code between the existing Sections 505 and 506.
Under this new section, it is a crime to:
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“undermine public trust in the government and the military,”
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“incite, persuade, or organize civil servants to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM),”
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or “cause fear or alarm among the public or any particular group, or incite one group against another—whether between citizens, ethnic groups, or communities—in a way that leads to crimes being committed.”
The text of Section 505-A also folds in broad offense definitions related to “causing fear,” “spreading rumors,” “disseminating false news,” and “committing criminal acts” under those pretexts.
When the junta promulgated this section in the second week of February 2021, it simultaneously increased the penalties compared with the original Section 505, and crafted it as a police- and prosecution-friendly tool.
The section further specifies that attempting to:
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obstruct or disrupt the morale, discipline, health, or performance of civil servants and members of the armed forces while they are carrying out their duties, or
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cause them to hate their work or break their oath of loyalty
also constitutes a criminal offense.
From this wording, it is clear that Section 505-A was designed specifically in response to events that emerged in the days immediately following the coup: to threaten and retaliate against the CDM movement, and to criminalize those who supported, encouraged, or organized it.
Arrest warrants have been issued for 5,580 people under this law, and it is estimated that at least 3,000 to 5,000 people have actually been arrested and punished under it.
Given that 726 people convicted solely under Section 505-A are now said to have been released, we can roughly infer that:
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those 700-plus are now completely free, while
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the more than 2,300 convicted under multiple sections will continue to serve their remaining sentences, with only the 505-A portion removed from the total.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which supports and monitors political prisoners, has stated that more than 20,000 people remain behind bars under politically motivated charges.
It is impossible to know the exact accuracy of that figure, but since the coup, over 30,000 people have been arrested on political grounds, and the majority of them have been charged under repressive provisions such as Section 505-A.
With tens of thousands of people jailed, and with sentences being handed down, extended, or added under multiple charges, it is extremely difficult to obtain precise, comprehensive records of every individual’s status and remaining term.
This raises the question: what is the main political purpose of this newly announced “505-A amnesty”?
Some people are linking it to the recent U.S. decision not to extend Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Myanmar nationals in America. That may be a coincidence, but the U.S. move is probably just one overlapping factor at most.
A more plausible explanation is that the junta, facing deep international mistrust about its upcoming election, is trying to gain at least a small measure of credibility by releasing a portion of political prisoners—hoping to attract attention, soften criticism, or win some level of recognition from abroad.
During the 2010 election period, the then-military government (SPDC/USDP) did not release political prisoners before the polls. Instead, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—who was under extended house arrest under the State Protection Act—was released on November 13, shortly after the election, when her term expired.
Many other political prisoners were only released later, in 2011 and 2012, after President Thein Sein’s government had taken office following the 2010 election.
The coming election cannot be meaningfully compared with 2010; everyone recognizes that. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now serving a combined sentence of 33 years, has very slim prospects of being released either before or immediately after the vote.
Just a few days ago, however, Thailand’s Foreign Minister publicly said that it was time to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Thai cabinet members usually avoid making public comments on Myanmar’s internal politics, so for a minister in a country approaching its own general election to speak so plainly is somewhat unusual.
Inside Myanmar’s prisons, there are still tens of thousands of people detained in connection with armed resistance, urban guerrilla activities, and related operations—many serving long multi-year sentences. There are also hundreds or even thousands facing death sentences or life imprisonment.
Of course, the release of several hundred, or even a few thousand people, is something to be welcomed and celebrated. But the fact that tens of thousands of political prisoners remain behind bars makes it all the more urgent to:
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keep working for their release,
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support their mental resilience and material needs while they are imprisoned, and
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provide moral and practical support to their families.
Those tasks remain more important than ever.