Myanmar Spring Chronicle – October 27 Perspective
(MoeMaKa, October 28, 2025)
Two Years After Operation 1027: A Look Back and Ahead
On the morning of October 27, 2023, multiple towns and outposts across northern Shan State came under simultaneous attack by the Three Brotherhood Alliance — the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Their coordinated offensive targeted junta military bases, trade-route checkpoints, and other strategic positions. The alliance named the campaign “Operation 1027,” after the date it began.
Now, exactly two years later, Operation 1027 stands as a pivotal event that reshaped Myanmar’s political, military, economic, and social landscape, affected natural resource control and international relations, and influenced regional policies toward Myanmar. The anniversary provides an important moment to assess its impact and what it may mean for the near future.
Operation 1027 was not a hastily organized campaign. Leaders later revealed that the Brotherhood Alliance had been planning a joint offensive for years, even before the 2021 coup. These groups were not part of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and had already carried out joint attacks in August 2019, notably at Gote Twin Bridge and along the Mandalay–Muse highway.
When they launched the 2023 offensive, the alliance’s forces were far stronger — better armed, more coordinated, and facing a stretched, war-weary military regime. Within weeks, they captured towns, regiments, and regional command centers, seizing vast quantities of weapons and ammunition. Thousands of junta troops, including officers at the battalion commander level and above, were taken prisoner.
The alliance’s early victories galvanized morale across the country, inspiring new offensives: the “1111 Operation” in Kayah (Karenni) State on November 11, and a similar campaign in Rakhine State starting November 13, 2023. For several months, the junta was on the defensive nationwide. By January 2024, under Chinese mediation, both sides agreed to a ceasefire.
That ceasefire lasted about six months. In July 2024, the Brotherhood resumed hostilities in what some called Operation 1027 Phase Two, capturing Lashio, the Northeastern Regional Military Command, and towns such as Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw. Parallel resistance offensives in central Myanmar by Mandalay Region PDFs (MDY-PDFs) achieved local successes in Matayar and Patheingyi.
But by late August 2024, China’s policy shift — pressuring ethnic forces along its border to de-escalate — effectively halted the alliance’s momentum.
The pause cannot be explained solely by Chinese pressure. Internal factors also played a role:
-
Diverging interests among ethnic allies,
-
Ethnic nationalism and rivalries,
-
Conflicts over resource control and taxation rights,
-
And the lack of a shared administrative framework for governing captured areas.
Relations between the Brotherhood Alliance and Bamar-majority resistance groups have also cooled. Early hopes that the alliance would fight “until the revolution succeeded” faded after MNDAA agreed to a ceasefire and withdrew from Lashio, reportedly under Chinese mediation.
Two years later, the situation is uneven: TNLA and AA continue fighting the junta, while MNDAA has stopped. Meanwhile, the junta — having learned hard lessons from its 2023 losses — has replenished manpower through its forced conscription law, expanded drone and military training, and tightened logistics and intelligence.
These measures have strengthened the regime’s defensive capacity, at least temporarily, although they do not guarantee lasting control.
Now, on this two-year anniversary, key questions remain:
-
Is Operation 1027 truly over?
-
Will the Brotherhood Alliance ever act jointly again?
No formal declaration has been made, but signs of unity have faded. Some towns captured during the offensive have since been retaken by the junta, and cooperation among resistance forces appears increasingly fragmented.
The core lesson of Operation 1027 is not just its military success, but its exposure of the limits of coordination among Myanmar’s fragmented opposition. To move forward, ethnic armed groups, PDFs, and the NUG must engage in serious reflection — analyzing both achievements and failures — to guide the next phase of military and political strategy.
Only through such collective assessment can the revolution’s momentum be rebuilt — and the promise of Operation 1027 transformed from a moment of triumph into a lasting path toward change.