Myanmar Spring Chronicle – October 1 View
Moemaka, October 2, 2025
Three Karen armed groups say they will support and secure the election
On September 28, three Karen armed groups based in Kawkareik, Myawaddy, and Hlaingbwe townships met in Theik Kha Te village, Myawaddy Township, and announced they had agreed to cooperate in “protecting” the election that the military junta plans to conduct by any means.
The three groups are: the Border Guard Force rebranded as the Karen National Army (KNA) led by Saw Chit Thu; the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); and the KNU/KNLA (Peace Council). During the height of Operation 1027 in early 2024, when KNU/KNLA and joint PDF forces were gaining the upper hand in Karen State, Saw Chit Thu’s BGF publicly signaled it was breaking with its decades-long loyalty to the military and renamed itself the KNA. Yet when KNU/KNLA seized the Thingannyinaung strategic area and nearby battalions outside Myawaddy, the BGF inserted itself as a “buffer” to minimize junta losses and took over some camps. Since then, BGF units have also handled Myawaddy’s security, enabling some civilian junta departments to keep running border-trade checkpoints and gates.
In other words, the BGF did not truly sever ties with the junta; it merely kept its distance at the peak of Operation 1027. As the military regained room to operate, relations with KNU/KNLA and other Spring-Revolution forces shifted, culminating in this public pledge to help safeguard the election.
As for the DKBA, observers believe its decision is tied to the need for military protection and quid-pro-quos regarding land concessions to armed groups, the taxing of sizable revenues, and pressure from neighboring Thailand over cyber-scam compounds and related rackets in its areas.
Likewise, Saw Chit Thu’s BGF/KNA appears to seek the junta’s backing to weather sanctions and enforcement by Thailand and other governments targeting those same scam operations, for which it has provided protection. Historically, the BGF/KNA and DKBA are seen less as groups with clear political platforms than as armed organizations used to serve the personal interests of their leaders.
The third group, KNU/KNLA (Peace Council), is not known to protect scam centers or grant territory for them. But as a KNU/KNLA splinter, it sustains itself by taxing goods transported through its territory and has kept an independent stance—neither aligning with NUG nor KNU/KNLA in the Spring Revolution.
For the junta, the decision by these three Karen groups to support the election is something to acknowledge and likely involves recognition and deals behind the scenes.
After 1989, the military offered “peace” to ethnic armed groups that allowed them to keep their weapons and territories. Following the 2008 constitution, in 2009 Than Shwe’s regime (SPDC) pressured such groups to convert into Border Guard Forces (BGFs). The NDA-K in Kachin, PNO/PNA in southern Shan, DKBA in Karen, and the KNLP in Kayah became BGFs, partially inserted into the army’s chain of command.
The 2010 election was then held, and relations between the army and the non-BGB “ceasefire” groups cooled.
The 2025 election, however, is entirely different from 2010. The central government and army no longer have firm control over ethnic regions—and even in non-ethnic areas such as Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, and Bago, there is no capacity to hold a full, nationwide vote. The junta can only try to conduct polls in whatever constituencies remain under its reach.
Under these conditions—weak military and administrative control—the junta is clearly pursuing a strategy to split ethnic armed groups, keeping them neutral where they cannot be supportive, and mobilizing those willing to cooperate so that the election can go forward in at least some places.