Myanmar Spring Chronicle – September 30 View
(MoeMaKha), October 1, 2025
The latest battlefield picture in Northern Shan—and the back-and-forth fight for towns
In recent days one headline has dominated the news: the battle to seize Kyaukme. After years of face-to-face fighting around Taung Kham, the junta’s forces took the initiative once they recaptured Naungcho, pushing west along the Union Highway toward Kyaukme. By September 30 they had advanced to within about a mile of the town. Following the fall of Naungcho, villages between Naungcho and Kyaukme—such as Naungpain and Khaikhtone Hsone—saw successive clashes, with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) yielding ground. The latest situation suggests TNLA is preparing to pull out of Kyaukme.
Today’s reports focus on fires in Kyaukme at several sites: the district administration office, the USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party) office, the fire department, a police post, and the immigration office. Since yesterday afternoon, video clips and photos of buildings ablaze have spread across social media; in one clip, residents watch nervously, fearing the flames will spread to nearby homes.
In war, a withdrawing force often uses scorched-earth tactics to deny the enemy facilities and supplies; many therefore assume TNLA torched these locations before pulling back. Some outlets, however, report that junta troops started the fires with incendiary munitions, while others simply note that certain sites are burning without stating a cause. A few cite locals who say the fires were arson.
Photos of the blaze at the fire station show no blast damage to roofs or structures typical of an air-strike; instead, a fire engine burning on the ground floor with flames spreading to the rear building—details that look more like arson than a bombing.
Urban capture battles regularly bring civilian harm: residents unable to flee are killed or wounded; at times armed groups beat or execute people on suspicion; when most townsfolk evacuate, looting and house-burning occur; while in other places those who stay behind risk their homes and property to prevent loss. In Kawkareik (Karen State), for example, some residents continued living in town amid active fighting.
From late 2023 onward, resistance forces seized over 100 towns (including bases, operation commands, and regional HQs) previously held by the military. In 2025, around ten of those towns have been retaken by junta forces, leaving 90-plus still out of the regime’s hands.
The Kyaukme episode underscores a pattern of see-saw town offensives between the resistance and the junta. For civilians who rely on towns to live and trade, this means repeated casualties, loss of property, livelihoods and capital—hardships that can breed doubts about whether such fighting truly benefits the revolution and can sap morale.
During the first and second waves of Operation 1027, people in the affected areas endured the costs with a sense of future hope and largely kept their counsel. But in this current, back-and-forth phase of town battles, there is a real risk that public support—material and moral—for the armed struggle will decline.
Town-seizure operations may be an unavoidable stage on the path to defeating the junta and ending military rule. Yet in a people-based armed struggle—without robust backing from powerful foreign states—planners must also weigh the public’s tolerance and capacity to endure.
It is time to re-examine how far these town-capture campaigns actually advance victory: are they strategically decisive, or primarily aimed at demonstrating success and securing tax revenue and manpower from newly held areas?