Myanmar Spring Chronicle – View from September 29
(MoeMaKa), September 30, 2025
Kyaukme Becomes the Second Town the TNLA Has Had to Withdraw From
After the junta retook Nawnghkio in mid-July—ending roughly a year of TNLA control—events two-plus months later now suggest the army is close to capturing Kyaukme as well. In the second wave of Operation 1027, the TNLA had rapidly seized Mogok, Kyaukme, and Nawnghkio. At that time, junta forces lost, in quick succession, towns, bases, strategic posts and operational headquarters across the Kokang area, northern Shan State, and the northern Sagaing areas bordering northern Shan, and for about a year mounted a last-ditch defense around Taung Khan south of Nawnghkio.
Since early 2025, however, the ceasefire between the junta and Kokang forces gave the military council breathing room to recover from its most constrained phase, regroup manpower, and rework strategy and tactics.
With Taung Khan held as a forward line for nearly a year, the TNLA gradually pulled back; in recent months the junta recaptured Nawnghkio and then pushed on to Kyaukme. If Kyaukme falls, many conclude that Hsipaw and Mogok could be the next targets for junta offensives.
The Muse–Mandalay corridor is not only a cross-border trade route but also the single most strategic line for administration and territorial control. In Myanmar–China trade, the Mandalay–Muse route, and the Sagaing–Shwebo–Mansi–Bhamo route to the Chinese border, are the shortest, most convenient links from central Myanmar. From this angle, the junta will throw everything into holding Bhamo while also pushing hard to re-establish control over the Kyaukme–Lashio–Muse road.
This raises the question: why can’t the TNLA now carry out the kind of rapid offensives and territorial takeovers it achieved in the first and second phases of Operation 1027? Since the January ceasefire between the military and the MNDAA, the Northern Alliance no longer conducts joint strikes in the same way. Moreover, other armed groups that previously provided manpower and joint operations—PLA, BPLA, KNDF, and PDFs from Sagaing Region—have not been assisting this year. There’s no clear answer as to why these forces are no longer fighting together. Some attribute it to Chinese pressure on the Wa, Kokang, and TNLA, but such pressure does not extend to every armed group in the central Dry Zone or the east. For example, groups like KNDF, BPLA, and PDFs in Sagaing and Mandalay have not been able to mass fighters as before—likely for political and organizational (mobilization) reasons as well.
After the TNLA captured areas, frictions over territorial administration and tax collection arose with neighboring allies such as the KIA along shared boundaries—another factor that may have left the TNLA more isolated.
On the afternoon of September 29, a Ta’ang-area media outlet, Shwe Phi Myay, ran an analysis titled along the lines of “Tracing the Reasons the Ta’ang Army Is Losing Towns.” It argued that arms smuggling by TNLA officers and misuse of soldiers’ monthly allowances and living expenses had led to ammunition shortages and falling morale. According to the piece, what began as selling captured junta weapons (e.g., RPG rounds) evolved into selling off ammo delivered for TNLA operations. The article was taken down a few hours after publication.
The TNLA won many victories and seized towns, areas, and bases during the first two phases of Operation 1027. Now, facing junta offensives largely on its own, Chinese pressure is undoubtedly a major factor; but beyond withstanding that pressure, the TNLA also needs to value and preserve alliances with other armed groups and reassess how to secure the support of local populations of different ethnicities in areas it governs. Ups and downs are part and parcel of armed struggle; at the same time, today’s conditions are also pushing toward renewed effort on the political and mass-organizing front.