Myanmar Spring Chronicle – October 24 Perspective
(MoeMaKa, October 25, 2025)
ASEAN Chair Malaysia Says It Cannot Block Myanmar Junta’s Planned Election
Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, whose country currently holds the rotating ASEAN chairmanship, said that the regional bloc cannot prevent Myanmar’s military regime from holding elections scheduled for December or early next year. He stated that ASEAN can only urge the junta to ensure the vote is free, fair, and inclusive, speaking days before ASEAN leaders are due to meet.
In recent weeks, the National Unity Government (NUG) and several ethnic armed organizations have called on ASEAN to reject and refuse to recognize the junta’s planned election. The NUG released a statement emphasizing that ASEAN should not legitimize what it calls a “sham election.” Earlier this month, NUG representatives met ASEAN officials in Malaysia, where they reportedly pressed for ASEAN to publicly denounce the junta’s plan.
The military council, which seized power nearly five years ago, is preparing to hold an election that critics say is designed to consolidate military rule under the USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party), led by former generals. Many question whether the international community will recognize any government that emerges from such an election.
Both domestic and international observers are well aware that the military has rewritten electoral laws to favor its own party, ensuring that opposition forces—particularly the NLD (National League for Democracy)—are disqualified or banned. The process is widely seen as neither fair nor legitimate.
However, ASEAN’s stance remains cautious. The bloc has no policy to outright oppose or invalidate the junta’s election. Its approach seems to be that Myanmar’s people must ultimately decide on the election’s legitimacy, not ASEAN.
European Union and Western governments are expected to take similar positions—avoiding endorsement, but also avoiding direct interference. Under the current Trump administration, the United States has shown limited engagement in Southeast Asia, adopting a transactional foreign policy focused mainly on direct U.S. interests. Recently, U.S. embassies have reportedly instructed staff not to comment publicly on other countries’ elections, suggesting that Washington may maintain a low-profile response regarding Myanmar’s upcoming vote.
Thus, the U.S. is unlikely to issue strong condemnations or spend diplomatic capital on Myanmar’s election; it views the issue as peripheral to its core interests.
The upcoming ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur will draw not only regional leaders but also representatives from major global powers. Discussion of Myanmar’s situation—particularly the planned election, cessation of violence, and humanitarian access—is expected to figure prominently, in line with ASEAN’s “Five-Point Consensus.”
Overall, ASEAN and the EU are not expected to endorse the junta’s election, but neither are they likely to actively challenge or obstruct it.
This leaves opposition to the election squarely in the hands of Myanmar’s people and resistance forces. Yet among these anti-junta groups—whether under the NUG or outside it—there is no unified position or coordinated strategy on how to confront the junta’s vote.
Political party members, candidates, election workers, campaigners, and citizens pressured to vote are all part of this complex process. Their attitudes and choices will matter, and it is now time for resistance leaders to clarify guidance for those inside the country.
If revolutionary forces resort to violence or intimidation—arresting or killing election officials, party workers, or candidates—they risk drawing international condemnation.
Therefore, pro-democracy groups must focus on nonviolent civic resistance: urging citizens to boycott or disengage from the process while avoiding harm. Public campaigns should emphasize safety, solidarity, and defiance without creating new victims.
This upcoming election will not cleanse the junta or transform it into a legitimate government overnight. But symbolically, it could still provide the regime with a veneer of legality—a technical claim to authority under its own decrees.
That illusion of legality, rather than genuine legitimacy, is precisely what the junta hopes to achieve — and what the people of Myanmar must see through.