Myanmar Spring Chronicle – View from September 18

(MoeMaKa, September 19, 2025)

Timor-Leste’s ASEAN Accession Bid and Its Relations with Myanmar’s Military Regime

Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, Timor-Leste—whose president and prime minister formally received members of the National Unity Government (NUG)—now shows signs of having to accommodate the military regime in connection with its effort to join ASEAN.

According to a September 18 statement from the junta’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Timor-Leste’s foreign minister paid an official visit to Myanmar from September 17–19 to discuss bilateral issues. The statement emphasized that Timor-Leste agreed not to allow organizations opposing the Myanmar (military) government to open offices or carry out unlawful anti-government activities, and that the junta offered to open a Myanmar embassy in Dili.

Timor-Leste has studied ASEAN membership for several years and entered formal talks this year. During that process, Myanmar’s military council—an ASEAN member—objected, accusing Timor-Leste of breaching ASEAN’s non-interference principle by involving itself in another country’s internal affairs.

Timor-Leste not only declined to endorse the coup; it also hosted the NUG’s foreign minister and other cabinet members with the trappings of an official government. Although the junta protested, Timor-Leste’s leaders—shaped by their own anti-colonial struggle—publicly backed Myanmar’s democratic movement by analogy to their experience. For the NUG, Timor-Leste—though a small Pacific nation—has been regarded as one of its strongest diplomatic supporters.

However, to overcome the Myanmar military’s objections that impede its ASEAN entry, Timor-Leste may now have to downgrade its ties with the NUG.

This episode also adds to the recognition and advantages the junta has recently accrued through closer relations with powerful regional states—not only China but India as well—such as attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Tianjin as an observer/study participant, and being invited in Beijing to events marking the 80th anniversary of victory over fascism.

In recent days, there have been reciprocal study visits involving more than a hundred personnel between the Indian and Myanmar militaries, indicating deepening ties with India. Meanwhile, U.S. tariff moves affecting former partners have nudged India closer to China; during Min Aung Hlaing’s recent trip to China, an agreement was signed to build a highway traversing Myanmar as a land bridge between the two countries—illustrating the evolving regional geopolitical landscape.

Since the March 28 Sagaing earthquake, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has had multiple opportunities to meet leaders of regional countries including India, China, and Russia, and some of these states now appear to offer at least partial support for the upcoming election. Even if ASEAN members are not openly endorsing it, China and India can be said to support it.

Taken together, the Timor-Leste development can be seen as a setback for the NUG on the diplomatic front. At the same time, the fact that U Kyaw Moe Tun still holds Myanmar’s U.N. seat counts as a diplomatic success. The conclusion is that the NUG must closely watch shifting regional attitudes toward the junta and conduct its diplomacy with prudence and finesse.