Myanmar Spring Chronicle – View from September 5

(Moemaka), September 6, 2025

BGF in Karen State to assist the election; junta retakes the strategic Thingan Nyi Naung area near Myawaddy

Reports emerged that at a September 3 meeting, the Border Guard Forces (BGF) led by Saw Chit Thu, which had previously inserted itself between the KNU/KNLA and the military around Myawaddy, decided to support and help the election the junta says it will hold.

In early 2024, KNU/KNLA and allied PDF units seized a string of strategic bases and regiments in Myawaddy Township and even captured the so-called town-security unit “Khalar 275” (Battalion 275). Hundreds of junta troops then fell back toward the Thai–Myanmar Friendship Bridge (No. 2) and held out there for some time. During that period, the BGF, under Saw Chit Thu, acted as an intermediary and effectively kept control of Myawaddy, which most understand as having rescued the trapped junta troops. The KNU/KNLA, for their part, refrained from further attacks inside Myawaddy in line with the non-interfight understanding among Karen armed groups.

The BGF later announced plans to form a Karen National Army (KNA) and publicly said they would no longer carry out operations on the junta’s behalf. Even so, to this day the junta’s immigration, police, and other administrative departments have continued operating in Myawaddy, handling border crossings, customs, and issues related to online scam syndicates and the repatriation of foreign victims—while BGF forces have maintained the town’s security.

Against that backdrop, the junta launched a large operation—with thousands of troops—to retake the Asian Highway segment Kawkareik–Thingan Nyi Naung–Myawaddy, which had been under KNU/KNLA control for nearly two years with no through traffic. By September 5, reports said the column advancing from Kawkareik toward Myawaddy and junta forces based on the Myawaddy side linked up after crossing the Dawna Range, around Thingan Nyi Naung.

After several weeks of fierce clashes and gradual advances, the junta appears to have broken through the KNU/KNLA and PDF lines that had sealed the route. While details remain unclear, some accounts say that although the BGF did not directly fight the resistance, they vacated certain positions/ridges, allowing junta forces to occupy them and punch through the blockade. The key factors seem to have been large manpower, drones, and air support, enabling the army to cross the Dawna Mountains and push to retake the Thingan Nyi Naung strategic camps and the Asian Highway before reaching Myawaddy.

Along the wider Karen and Tanintharyi frontier, the junta had lost numerous border outposts in recent months; nevertheless, it appears to have prioritized first regaining the strategic bases and the Asian Highway inside Myawaddy Township over re-securing every border post.

The BGF’s stance seems to have mattered here as well. After more than a year of ambiguity—neither clearly backing nor opposing the junta—the BGF’s decision to assist the election appears to coincide with some level of aid to the junta’s push to control the Asian Highway.

For over a year the junta has been unable to fully control Thai–Myanmar border trade, with much of the customs revenue along the route flowing to resistance groups. This operation therefore looks aimed at reversing or halting that situation.

In recent weeks the junta closed Friendship Bridge No. 2 at Myawaddy and impounded Thai cargo trucks in Hpa-an, effectively halting border trade and directing commerce to the Ranong–Kawthaung sea route. The current Asian Highway offensive is connected to those moves. If the army secures the highway and the Thingan Nyi Naung strategic belt near Myawaddy, it may reopen border trade on its own terms.

In short, this operation likely serves two purposes: (1) territorial expansion before the planned election, and (2) cutting off tax revenues that resistance armed groups derive from Thailand–Myanmar border trade.