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The Military Commission’s Grand Strategy Against Resistance Armed Groups

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Myanmar Spring Chronicle – August 25 Highlights
(MoeMaKa, August 26, 2025)

The Military Commission’s Grand Strategy Against Resistance Armed Groups

In the lead-up to the elections planned for the end of the year, Myanmar’s junta has begun launching counteroffensives to retake some territories held by the resistance armed groups.

Although in some areas the junta is still holding defensive positions, it has clearly started planning and executing offensives and supply-line disruptions as part of a wider strategy.

Between late 2023 and late 2024, the junta lost control of many bases, towns, and administrative areas across the country. But by early 2025, the frontlines began to stabilize somewhat. Since mid-2025, however, the junta has resumed offensives—not only militarily but also targeting the financial and resource flows sustaining the resistance.

Areas of Current and Planned Offensives

Across Myanmar, the following areas are under attack or being prepared for offensives:

  • Kachin State: Hpakant jade mining areas, with offensives of 800–1000 troops aimed at cutting KIA revenue; defensive reinforcements in Bhamo (BNI 21 base).

  • Sagaing Region: Multiple townships facing operations.

  • Magway (Upper Yaw area): Active fighting.

  • Northern Shan State: Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Mogok under pressure, with offensives aimed at retaking key trade towns along the Mandalay–Muse route.

  • Mandalay Region: Thabeikkyin, Singu—gold-producing areas under attack, with reports of junta retaking Thabeikkyin and recently Pyaung Taung mines in Patheingyi.

  • Southern Shan & Kayah (Karenni) State: Junta recently retook Demoso, securing the Pinlaung–Hpruso–Loikaw road link.

  • Karen State: Junta blocking border trade routes at Myawaddy and Kawkareik (Asia Highway, old Kawkareik–Thingannyinaung road), aiming to reduce revenues collected by KNU, PDFs, and DKBA.

  • Bago Region (adjacent to Rakhine): Junta’s goal is to block AA expansion inland rather than retake Rakhine.

  • Tanintharyi Region: Natural gas pipelines crossing the Thai border remain under KNU/KNLA and KTLA control, though these pipelines don’t generate customs-style revenues like trade routes.

The Case of Rakhine

Although the junta lost almost all of Rakhine State to AA, it has shifted strategy. Rather than attempting to reconquer the whole state, it is focusing on defending Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, while blocking AA’s expansion into Ayeyarwady and Bago.

The junta is increasingly prioritizing resource-rich areas and trade corridors in central, northern, and eastern Myanmar over trying to win back the entire Rakhine front.

The Larger Strategy

The junta’s grand strategy has two objectives:

  1. Territorial control – regaining key towns, roads, and bases.

  2. Economic warfare – cutting off the taxation and revenue streams of resistance forces by:

    • Retaking jade mines (Kachin)

    • Blocking gold mining areas (Mogok, Thabeikkyin, Singu)

    • Seizing trade routes (Mandalay–Muse corridor, Myawaddy border trade, Pathein–Sagaing lines)

    • Limiting AA’s inland expansion from Rakhine

By combining offensives with economic blockades, the junta hopes to weaken the armed resistance both militarily and financially.

👉 In short: the junta’s battlefield strategy in late 2025 is not only about land—it is about choking the revenue lifelines of the resistance.