Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 31 Perspective
(MoeMaKa, August 1, 2025)
The Beginning of the 2025 Election Landscape — Not the Same as 2010
Four and a half years after the military coup, the junta—formally named the State Administration Council—announced on July 31 that it was handing over authority to a newly formed “National Defense and Security Council” (abbreviated as NDSC or Ka/Lone), and establishing a new “State Security and Tranquility Commission” (referred to as NaLaA) with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win playing key roles. Despite the rebranding, about 90% of the members remain the same, clearly showing that real power still lies with the military leadership.
The announcement included reshuffling a few ministers and creating new bodies, but it is widely seen as a procedural setup ahead of the general election the junta says it will hold in December 2025 or January 2026. These structural changes do not reflect any real shift in governance, as Min Aung Hlaing continues to hold top positions: acting president, head of the military (Commander-in-Chief), and now Chairman of the State Security and Tranquility Commission. Essentially, he is handing over authority to himself.
The appearance of a “handover” — both from and to the same individual — only reinforces the image of a regime concentrated in the hands of one man, with no meaningful trust in or power given to other senior generals.
Though the junta initially claimed that elections would be held soon after the coup, it continuously delayed the process under various pretexts—investigating the 2020 voter list, electoral fraud allegations, and so forth—until over four years had passed.
After the military lost substantial territory during Operation 1027, they came under pressure to hold elections as part of a diplomatic maneuver. Observers believe the election timeline was set primarily to satisfy pressure from China, which fears Myanmar devolving into a fragmented state governed by various armed groups. By establishing a centralized authority through elections, China may be trying to stabilize its neighbor to protect its strategic and economic interests.
Thus, the current push to hold elections by late 2025 or early 2026 appears driven more by external pressures than internal readiness. Comparisons are now being made with the 1990 election, which followed the 1988 coup but was ultimately nullified by the military for lacking a constitution. That military government stayed in power for over two decades.
Min Aung Hlaing seems to be considering the 2010 election model, when the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), formed by ex-generals, gained power and a general-turned-president was installed. However, the current political and military environment of 2025 is vastly different from 2010.
The military now faces widespread armed resistance, an economy in freefall, and popular hatred that exceeds even the anti-military sentiment of the 1949–50s. Unlike in the post-1988 period, armed opposition has consolidated under platforms like NUG and PDF, and the junta knows it cannot stretch out its rule for decades like Than Shwe did.
This leaves Min Aung Hlaing with limited options. He likely aims to use the 2025 election as a means to extend his rule under the guise of civilian governance, possibly running as president again under a military-aligned party. But the country’s political and military conditions are far more hostile now than in 2010.
Internationally, Myanmar’s crisis has been overshadowed by other global events—the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza crisis, and US-European involvement in Middle East conflicts. China remains the only major power actively engaged in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
So, the election—along with the creation of new commissions, rebranding, and bureaucratic shuffles—is seen as part of a political sleight of hand. Whether this deception will succeed in convincing the Myanmar public or the international community will become clearer over the next six months to a year.