Myanmar Spring Chronicle – August 14 Perspective
Moemaka, August 15, 2025
Changing Dynamics in Myanmar Ahead of the Upcoming Election
Roughly six months ahead of the military-planned election, scheduled for late 2025 or early 2026, Myanmar is witnessing shifting dynamics both politically and militarily. These include the military junta’s restructuring of governance — transitioning from the State Administration Council to the Defense and Security Council (referred to by media as “DLC” or “Peace & Stability Council”) — as well as their ongoing efforts to assert control over power and manage the state.
Simultaneously, in foreign relations, the junta is striving to re-establish diplomatic engagement and attempting to secure minimal international recognition following the election. From the perspective of the resistance forces, this upcoming military-run election is seen as a tactic to divert attention and alleviate some international pressure on junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and his increasingly isolated regime.
Yet, regional powers like China and India view the election as a potential de-escalation tool for Myanmar’s ongoing armed conflict. China, in particular, has publicly expressed support for the junta’s election roadmap and has been pressuring certain ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) near its border to return seized territory and cease hostilities.
China appears to prefer a stable status quo and does not support any dramatic reversal of power that would disrupt the central authority of Myanmar’s military. Over the past year, Beijing has made its position clear by resuming arms sales, transferring technology, providing aid, and offering financial lifelines to the cash-strapped junta.
On August 14, 2025, foreign ministers from the junta and China met in Anning, Yunnan Province, and both sides issued official statements. China’s statement listed three hopes for Myanmar:
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A government based on public will and national reconciliation;
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Broad unity and restorative justice;
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A peaceful, socially harmonious post-earthquake recovery process focused on national development and well-being.
While these goals seem ideal, they implicitly challenge the legitimacy of the junta’s current election preparations. For example, forming a government “based on public will” would likely exclude the military’s sham electoral process. Similarly, achieving national reconciliation and broad unity seems far-fetched under the current military framework.
Nevertheless, China appears to understand that these ideals are unlikely to be fully achieved and is pragmatically monitoring the situation on the ground, willing to accept less-than-perfect outcomes.
These developments show that the junta is actively attempting to regain diplomatic and military footing after its devastating losses during the 1027 Operation. Regionally, the military has managed to rekindle some diplomatic contacts — with some ASEAN foreign ministers expected to visit Naypyidaw soon. These visits follow an earlier humanitarian-focused trip after the powerful earthquakes in the Sagaing and Mandalay regions.
While the junta attempts to “claw its way back” from isolation, ASEAN and China have not openly condemned its aerial bombings that continue to cause mass civilian casualties — a silence that speaks volumes.
On the resistance side, however, there is no visible increase in strategic political or military coordination among the major players: ethnic armed organizations, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the various PDF groups. The highest level of military cooperation was seen between October 27, 2023, and late 2024 — but after that, large-scale joint victories have been rare.
Resistance-held territories continue to be vulnerable to airstrikes, and disagreements over territorial control, taxation, and resource extraction have caused friction between allied forces. In some areas, this has begun to erode civilian support that was gained during military victories.
Meanwhile, the NUG has also not delivered significant new political gains in recent months. As a result, calls for internal reform of the NUG have started to surface, even among its own allies and partners.
In this pre-election period, it is urgently important for the resistance movement to:
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Refocus,
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Build deeper coordination, and
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Develop new strategic initiatives that will allow them to counter the junta’s evolving tactics effectively.
Without that, the junta’s staged election may not bring legitimacy — but it could succeed in muddying the waters and regaining ground both diplomatically and militarily.