“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 9 Perspective”
(Moemaka, July 10, 2025):
The “New Normal” Conditions of Civil War
A resident of Myitkyina recently posted on Facebook that the price of gasoline in the town has reached 7,800 kyats per liter, which they said should not be acceptable. The post included a breakdown of tolls and checkpoint fees incurred along the transportation route from Yangon to Myitkyina. While gasoline sells for about 3,000 kyats per liter in Yangon and 3,500 kyats in Mandalay, in Myitkyina it has risen to 7,800 kyats.
Commenters added that in Hpakant, prices are even higher—around 8,900 kyats per liter. During periods of intense conflict in previous years, prices in some areas of Rakhine State even soared to around 30,000 kyats per liter. Currently, they hover between 12,000 and 13,000 kyats in those regions.
In Karen State’s Kawkareik town, where military forces have recently regained control and cut off access due to fighting, prices have spiked to around 20,000 kyats per liter, according to some reports.
Generally, areas under junta control have blocked the transport of fuel, food, and medicine into territories held by resistance forces. Even towns that have not seen direct conflict are experiencing steep price hikes due to this disruption. The second contributing factor is the large number of checkpoints along transport routes, where various groups impose taxes and fees based on cargo value.
For example, transporting goods by road from Yangon to Myitkyina involves no tolls on the Yangon–Mandalay expressway. But once a vehicle leaves Mandalay and enters Sagaing Region and beyond, it must pass through many checkpoints operated by various armed groups—each imposing a percentage-based levy on the goods.
All goods transported into Kachin State and Upper Sagaing Region are taxed this way. These multiple layers of taxation could generate a considerable daily revenue at each checkpoint. It is understood that there are more checkpoints managed by resistance forces than those by the junta along the Mandalay–Myitkyina route. However, it remains unclear whether all the taxes collected are being systematically used for the revolution.
In a recent post by Dr. Theza San—who publicly criticized NUG governance—he also pointed out that while many areas are collecting significant revenue and hold substantial power, there is a lack of effective redistribution to regions that need it most. This creates opportunities for misuse and corruption, he argued.
While it is understandable that taxes must be collected to fund the armed resistance, concerns are rising about the consistency and fairness of how these funds are collected and spent. Are taxes adjusted over time? Are they causing inflation? Are they justified in proportion to the burden being placed on civilians—especially in conflict zones?
Currently, the only areas not experiencing civil war are Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and a few cities in some states and regions. Yet even in relatively stable cities like Myitkyina and Sittwe, residents are suffering from price hikes due to transport disruptions and excessive taxation by various armed groups.
People in these towns are experiencing economic hardship—akin to slowly drowning in rising costs—even though no battles are being fought on their doorsteps. Meanwhile, those living in conflict zones face the added threat of losing homes, property, and even their lives due to bombs and arson attacks.
While the public has so far tolerated inflation and hardship as part of the revolutionary struggle, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to endure. The ongoing cycle of towns being captured, lost, and recaptured is leading to repeated destruction and disillusionment.
As these conditions persist, they are becoming accepted as the “new normal.” People are adapting to instability as if it were normal. But as public tolerance and resilience begin to wear thin, it may be time for political and military leadership of the revolution to reassess and reform their approach.