Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 27 Viewpoint
(MoeMaKa – July 28, 2025)
The Life of Myanmar People Enduring One Wave of Flooding After Another
Every year during the monsoon season, certain regions of Myanmar suffer from flooding. This is partly due to global warming, with its impacts including increasingly extreme weather patterns—heavier rainfall, more frequent and intense storms—as well as deforestation in inhabited areas. These factors have led to rapid flash floods and rising river levels that damage homes, farmlands, and livestock.
Myanmar is among the countries highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Just last year, Cyclone Mocha, which formed in the Bay of Bengal, devastated Rakhine State. The remnants of Typhoon Yagi from the South China Sea also brought heavy rain to Shan State, Mandalay Region, and Bago Region, causing dozens of deaths and significant destruction to homes and farmland.
This year, even before the end of July—the mid-monsoon period—continuous heavy rainfall driven by strong monsoon winds has already triggered flooding in Kayin State, Mon State, Bago Region, and both southern and eastern parts of Shan State. On July 27, rising water levels in the Mae Sai River led to flooding in both Tachileik (Myanmar) and its neighboring Thai town of Mae Sai. Similarly, in southern Shan, the towns of Kalaw and Shwenyaung have seen rising creek levels, with schools and residential areas submerged, as documented on social media.
In Kayin State, Myawaddy town was already flooded in previous days, and as of July 27, Hpa-An town saw the Salween River rise over 4 feet above danger level, flooding nearby neighborhoods. In Bago Region and along the Sittaung River in Taungoo, flood warnings remain in place.
In conflict zones, internally displaced people who have already fled their homes due to fighting now face flooding where they are sheltering—one layer of suffering compounding another.
Due to excessive extraction of natural resources, rainfall quickly runs off mountains and rivers into low-lying populated areas and farmland, causing fatalities and food losses.
With over four years of civil war, the country is no longer in a position to carry out full-scale disaster response like in peaceful times, when government capacity, planning, and support would have been available.
During Cyclone Mocha in 2023, the military council still controlled much of Rakhine State and was able to stage rescue operations—albeit performatively. This year, some Rakhine townships have already reported flooding, but the junta now controls only two towns (Kyaukphyu and Sittwe), so there is effectively no official rescue response. Moreover, the junta’s blockade of goods into Rakhine has worsened the humanitarian impact of natural disasters.
Earthquake-affected areas such as Sagaing, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw, still reeling from the tremors of March, now face additional flood risks.
Since the military coup, the economy has declined significantly. Excessive extraction of natural resources, fueled by the need to fund war expenditures, has accelerated environmental degradation. The revenues from these resources often go toward military spending or private profiteering, and no disaster contingency funds remain.
For resistance forces, victory in the war is often seen as the first, second, and third priority. Emergency relief and natural disaster response are often deprioritized under the reasoning that such efforts are not possible until the military dictatorship is overthrown. While this may make sense in theory, for ordinary civilians, survival amid war, natural disasters, and hunger is a daily struggle, even before any “final victory” is achieved.