Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 21 Viewpoint
(MoeMaKa, July 22, 2025)
The Fall of Naung Cho and Mobye: Reflections on the Spring Revolution’s Strategic Direction
In recent days, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) lost control of Naung Cho, a town it had governed for over a year. Around the same time, Mobye, a town in Karenni (Kayah) State, also fell from the hands of KNDF and allied resistance forces. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been attempting for over six months to seize Bhamo and the adjacent SAC’s Strategic Command HQ No. 21, but has not succeeded. The offensive appears to be stalling.
Elsewhere, in Hpakant, once declared free of junta forces, the military junta has returned—deploying 800 to 1000 troops and reaching the area largely unimpeded. There were no effective defensive operations by the KIA to stop this movement.
In Mandalay Region, the junta has recaptured some territories previously held by MDY-PDF, though there are also reports of some junta bases being overtaken by resistance forces.
In Karen State, the KNU has successfully seized several border outposts, but no towns have been captured in recent weeks. The Arakan Army (AA), which had extended operations into border areas of Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway, is now focusing efforts on capturing Kyaukphyu, the last major junta-held city in Rakhine.
In Lashio, the junta is reinforcing and appears to be trying to restore the city to the status of a regional military command center. Meanwhile, an earlier junta expedition from Kalay to Thantlang aimed at retaking control of Chin State was repelled by local Chin defense forces and forced to retreat.
In Sagaing Region, the situation is relatively static. While outposts like Kan Daunt have seen skirmishes, no major towns have changed hands. Similarly, in Pa-O, Mon State, and Tanintharyi, both sides have mostly maintained their positions, with no significant losses or gains.
The Strategic Implications of Losing Naung Cho and Mobye
The loss of Naung Cho and Mobye has triggered a variety of commentaries from analysts, observers, and columnists, some of which have been published in independent media outlets.
Some have criticized TNLA for allegedly focusing more on governing and taxing the areas it captured, pushing for recognition of the “Palaung State,” and for friction with other resistance forces over taxation and natural resource control—factors that may have contributed to weakening its strategic coordination and vulnerability to junta counterattacks.
In the case of Mobye, the dynamics were reportedly different. According to KNDF’s deputy commander-in-chief Mawii, in an interview with DVB, the junta was able to retake the city due to disregard for casualties on their side, while the resistance prioritized minimizing loss of life. Furthermore, the junta received support from the pro-junta PNO (Pa-O National Organization), and according to another news outlet citing resistance sources, the use of drones by the military junta was a decisive factor.
While each of these explanations may be valid in their own contexts, the larger issue is clear: the Spring Revolution lacks a unified national military strategy. Even during Operation 1027, though not technically a nationwide operation, there was a concurrent surge of coordinated attacks across multiple fronts—suggesting a temporary unified strategic alignment.
At the time, various resistance groups from Sagaing, Magway, southern and northern Shan, Mandalay, and Karenni supported the Three Brotherhood Alliance with manpower and coordination. That level of cooperation appears to have diminished in the current phase.
This raises questions:
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Why hasn’t such a coordinated strategy been reestablished?
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Has the National Unity Government (NUG) failed to facilitate strategic alignment?
While there was no full political unification during Operation 1027, military coordination had produced tangible results. But now, with MNDAA entering a ceasefire reportedly due to Chinese pressure, and visible lack of joint operations between KIA, TNLA, and central-region PDFs, mutual strategic interests appear misaligned.
Although the Spring Revolution’s stated goal remains the total defeat of the junta and establishment of federal democracy, there is still no consensus on how federalism will be constructed or how power will be shared once victory is achieved. This strategic vacuum, coupled with emerging disputes over territory, taxation, and governance, poses a major challenge.
It is now imperative for revolutionary stakeholders to evaluate past actions, measure outcomes, and most importantly, determine a clear path forward. Without strategic unity and shared vision, the revolution risks stagnation or reversal. The window of opportunity created during Operation 1027 may not stay open indefinitely.