“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 7 Perspective”
(Published by MoeMaKa July 8, 2025):
Territorial Control, Governance, and the Shared Goal of the Revolution
The Spring Revolution’s core objective is to dismantle the military dictatorship—a regime that relies on military power to dominate all three branches of government: administrative, legislative, and judiciary. In the course of this revolution, actions such as armed resistance, territorial control, natural resource management, and tax collection are all taking place. This has raised questions about whether the primary goal remains the abolition of the military regime or whether resistance forces are increasingly motivated by power, resources, and revenue.
Indeed, defeating the military junta is essential to ending the dictatorship. To do this, revolutionary forces must become militarily stronger, ensure sufficient supplies of arms and ammunition, and strategically seize military bases and territories currently held by the junta. There is no debate on these operational necessities.
In practice, however, the situation is more complex. While most revolutionary armed groups—both majority-Bamar PDFs and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)—must cooperate to defeat the junta, some EAOs already control substantial territory, gained during earlier armed struggles for ethnic self-determination before the 2021 coup. These groups, including the Kachin, Karen, Shan, Pa-O, Palaung, Karenni, Chin, Rakhine, Mon, Wa, and Naga armed forces, maintain independent command structures and localized ambitions.
The 2021 coup sparked mass public outrage and reignited many armed struggles. Some EAOs that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) during the previous NLD government began reassessing or suspending their commitments. Karenni, Karen, and Chin forces resumed fighting early on. Non-signatories like the KIA, TNLA, MNDAA, and AA were already engaged in conflict. Eventually, even Pa-O forces (PNLA), who had signed the NCA, rejoined the fight.
In May 2021, NLD-aligned leaders and parliamentarians formed the National Unity Government (NUG) and established PDF forces, aiming to build military strength and reclaim territory. At that point, the revolutionary alliance largely avoided internal disputes over taxation and natural resource control. This relative harmony lasted until just before Operation 1027 in October 2023.
Following the sweeping victories of Operation 1027—seizing cities, bases, regional commands, and state-level army offices—competition and tension among revolutionary forces began to emerge. The first issues centered on taxation, customs duties, and resource extraction, particularly in northern Shan State. Excessive extraction of resources and preferential treatment for business cronies close to armed group leaders have become points of concern. While fundraising for weapons and operations is a legitimate need, unsustainable practices harm local communities, deplete water sources and forests, trigger environmental degradation, and compromise long-term access to vital resources—ultimately threatening the revolution’s own integrity.
In Tanintharyi, the unregulated explosion of mining activity in PDF-controlled areas has raised alarms. In Kachin State, rare earth extraction has caused serious environmental damage, especially during processing. Unlike other countries that refrain from rare earth mining due to pollution risks, China has outsourced such activity to Myanmar, including near the border. Recently, rare earth production has reportedly spread to eastern Shan State under UWSP control, affecting ecosystems and even Thai border communities.
Reports from Mogok—a city under TNLA control and formerly in Mandalay Region—highlight concerns over renewed ruby mining in areas untouched for decades, such as former golf courses. Residents fear overexploitation during uncertain control periods. Similarly, last year in Mongsi, MNDAA forces allegedly fired upon villagers protesting illegal gold mining near a vital water source, killing six.
Clashes have also occurred between EAOs. In Nam Ma, near Theinni and Lashio, MNDAA attempted to push out SSPP/SSA forces amid coal mining disputes, leading to armed confrontation. MNDAA was reportedly exporting coal to China via Kutkai and Chin Shwe Haw.
In Sagaing, revolutionary groups have allegedly permitted large-scale logging from previously protected forests like Aung Zeya’s Bamah-free zone. Though exact figures are unclear, it appears vast amounts of timber are being extracted during this unstable period. Along river systems in Sagaing and Mandalay, rampant gold dredging is causing sedimentation and toxic runoff, threatening ecosystems and communities far into the future.
Some argue that resource exploitation is a temporary necessity to fund resistance. While that may be partly true, the scale of extraction, lack of oversight, and questions over revenue transparency raise legitimate concerns. Without stable governance, it is impossible to ensure fair practices or accountability. This creates space for abuse and undermines the revolutionary goals and moral authority.
These issues are not limited to natural resources. Questions have also arisen about whether border trade tariffs and transport levies are collected fairly and whether the revenue is properly allocated to the revolution. Excessive taxation, diversion of funds, and lack of transparency can deepen the public’s burden and erode popular support—posing a serious risk to the revolution’s future.