Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 14 Viewpoint
Moemaka, July 15, 2025
Junta Troops Enter TNLA-Controlled Nawnghkio; Battle Shifts and Strategic Uncertainty Rises
On the afternoon of July 13, reports emerged that junta forces had begun entering parts of Nawnghkio, a town in northern Shan State that has been under the control of the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) since mid-2023. Although TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo stated in an interview with Myanmar Press Photo Agency that the situation was not yet critical, conflicting reports soon followed.
Shortly after the interview, other online outlets based in northern Shan State reported that junta troops had indeed entered the town, with government buildings and some residential areas reportedly on fire. The exact cause of the fires remained unclear amid the chaos.
Adding to the developments, the Gotwin Bridge near Nawnghkio was reported destroyed hours later. Observers speculate that the TNLA may have intentionally demolished the bridge to prevent junta forces from advancing further toward Kyaukme, another key town still under TNLA control. Nawnghkio, located along the Mandalay-Muse Union Highway, sits between Kyaukme and other TNLA-controlled towns such as Hsipaw and Kutkai.
Following the junta’s loss of Nawnghkio during the second phase of Operation 1027, its forces had resorted to defensive strategies around Taung Hkam and launched aggressive counterattacks. Nearly a year later, they are now pushing back into Nawnghkio—a symbolic and strategic move.
At the same time, in Thabeikkyin Township, northern Mandalay Region, the junta is launching offensives against a town jointly held by MDY-PDF and TNLA, indicating a coordinated campaign across multiple frontlines in Shan and Mandalay regions. These offensives are accompanied by daily airstrikes, resulting in civilian casualties and property destruction.
Since Operation 1027 was launched in late October 2023, thousands of civilians from northern Shan had fled their towns. Some had returned when fighting briefly subsided, only to be forced to flee again now due to renewed airstrikes and advancing ground forces.
While the early phases of Operation 1027 saw strong momentum and unity among resistance forces—including TNLA, PDF groups from Sagaing, and other ethnic armies like the Karenni (KNDF), Pa-O (PNLA), and Burman-led groups such as BPLA and PLA—that energy has since faded. The collaborative thrust that once enabled rapid town and base seizures no longer seems to hold.
After gaining substantial territory, the focus of some ethnic armed groups appeared to shift toward consolidating control rather than continuing joint offensives. This has led to internal friction and even territorial disputes among allies. For instance, the controversy surrounding MNDAA’s agreement to hand back Lashio to the junta signaled a breaking point in momentum for Operation 1027.
Now, with only TNLA actively confronting junta forces in northern Shan, and SSPP/SSA largely avoiding direct confrontation, the junta faces fewer opponents in the region. The question arises:
Do these ethnic armies still share the broader goal of completely dismantling the military dictatorship, or are they more focused on defending and administering their own autonomous zones?
In the early phase of Operation 1027, joint statements by the “Three Brotherhood Alliance” (TNLA, AA, MNDAA) referred to defeating the junta as a central goal. But such unified messaging has since faded.
The absence of a common military strategy or a comprehensive agreement between the National Unity Government (NUG) and various ethnic armed groups has become increasingly evident. Without this, ethnic groups might choose ceasefires or territorial deals when their own strategic goals are met.
Across Myanmar, while the junta continues to lose ground in places like Rakhine, northern Shan, Kachin, and Chin States, it has regained control in some areas like Kawkariek and Sawhti Township, and appears to be reinforcing its grip on Tanintharyi, Bago, and Mandalay regions.
Despite recent losses of border outposts to the KNU and allies, the junta has not yet lost any major towns in the Karen areas. This indicates that the regime still has enough strength to launch targeted counter-offensives.
In this context, analysts are suggesting that a new round of unified action is needed—a coordinated front akin to what was declared during the launch of Operation 1027. Unless a renewed alliance among ethnic armies, PDFs, and the NUG emerges with a shared strategic and political goal, the junta could regain strength through upcoming elections, military recruitment, expanded trade relations with China and even the U.S., and reopening border commerce.
Activists and observers are calling for not just renewed military coordination, but also governance synchronization—shared administration in liberated zones, tax coordination, and better delivery of public services. Many are waiting to see what lessons the pro-democracy movement has learned from Operation 1027, and how those will shape the road ahead.