Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 12 Viewpoint
(Moemaka, July 13, 2025):
Junta Forces Closing in on Naungcho; Gains and Losses of Strategic Outposts and Towns
The Myanmar military has been gradually advancing toward Naungcho, a town captured by the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) since mid-last year. After several months of counterattacks, junta forces are now reportedly within 2 to 3 miles of the town, and TNLA troops are said to be gradually retreating through defensive operations.
Last year, the TNLA was able to quickly seize Naungcho, and for months afterward, they launched offensives from there toward Taung Gyi Township, a strategically critical area held by the junta. However, after failing to make progress since the beginning of this year, the TNLA and allied PDF (People’s Defense Force) units have been forced to gradually pull back.
During the second phase of Operation 1027, the Northern Brotherhood Alliance—comprising three ethnic armed groups—along with PDF forces, succeeded in rapidly capturing towns, bases, and even key regional military command centers within weeks or months. TNLA had already taken control of self-administered Ta’ang areas such as Mantong and Namhsan in early 2023, and soon expanded their control to Kutkai, Mogok, Kyaukme, Naungcho, and Hsipaw. But with growing territory came growing limitations on further expansion.
The prolonged battle for Taung Gyi—a key target—dragged on for months. Meanwhile, MNDAA (Kokang Army) agreed to a ceasefire with the junta earlier this year, which allowed the military to consolidate in northeastern Shan State. Simultaneously, the initial momentum of Operation 1027’s joint forces weakened. Chinese diplomatic interventions, trade blockades along the border, and the junta’s increasing use of surveillance drones shifted the TNLA into a defensive posture.
A notable psychological boost for the junta came when they regained control of Lashio, Shan State’s key city, without even having to fight for it. That allowed them to re-establish a strategic foothold and deploy forces back into northern Shan.
Although the junta is facing defeats in some parts of the country, in northern Shan, backed by Chinese diplomacy and border trade leverage, they are gradually regaining some of the towns, regional commands, and bases lost earlier. In Bhamo, after more than six months of fighting, both sides have hit a stalemate. In contrast, in Naungcho, the junta appears poised to retake the town.
Since MNDAA exited Operation 1027 and signed a ceasefire, TNLA is now the only major resistance force still actively fighting in northern Shan. While SSPP/SSA (Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army) is present in the region, they are not currently engaging in direct combat with junta forces. This makes TNLA the lone active opponent in the area.
This raises an important question: Do ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) primarily aim to fully defeat the junta and dismantle military dictatorship? Or are they instead focusing on securing and holding their own territories, establishing de facto buffer zones?
In the early phase of Operation 1027, the Northern Brotherhood Alliance did issue joint statements implying a broader goal of toppling the junta. However, such messages have become rare in recent months.
This leads to another critical question: Is there a clear, shared military strategy or agreement between the National Unity Government (NUG) and the ethnic armed groups? So far, there appears to be no comprehensive joint military plan or operational framework that includes all major groups.
As such, some EAOs may now feel they have achieved or are close to achieving their own territorial objectives and may be inclined to accept ceasefires—perhaps under Chinese pressure—as a means of solidifying control over these areas without backtracking.
While the junta has suffered serious territorial losses in Rakhine, northern Shan, Kachin, and Chin, they have not lost ground this year in regions such as Karenni (Kayah), southern Shan, Karen, Tanintharyi, Bago, and Mandalay. In fact, they have regained control of towns like Sein Sai (taken by PNLA last year) and Kawkareik, and are now trying to hold those gains.
Although KNU and its allied PDF forces continue to seize junta border outposts along the Thai frontier, they have not managed to capture entire towns recently.
Overall, the military appears to be mostly holding its ground in many regions while making limited counteroffensives. This means that for the resistance movement—particularly the various armed groups—it is now critically important to unify under a common military strategy and command. Without such coordination, continued territorial fragmentation and uncoordinated offensives risk undermining broader goals of ending military rule.