Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 11
(Moemaka, July 12, 2025):
Civilian Casualties from Daily Airstrikes Intensify
The Myanmar military junta’s daily airstrikes—using fighter jets and bombing missions—have sharply increased in recent weeks, resulting in a growing number of civilian casualties. Whereas earlier attacks often caused one to three deaths, recent strikes have seen death tolls climb into double digits.
On the morning of July 11, the junta bombed a monastery sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Lintalu Village, killing around 30 people and injuring more than 50 others. This is among the deadliest airstrikes since similar attacks on Ohtainbin and Letpanhlar villages in recent months.
Lintalu is located in Sagaing Township, near the main road from Sagaing to Shwebo, just before reaching Salt Mountain (Sartaung). IDPs from nearby villages had taken refuge in the monastery there.
Unable to control territory on the ground, the junta relies on air reconnaissance and conducts daily aerial bombings across Myanmar, particularly targeting locations with PDFs (People’s Defense Forces) and pro-democracy armed groups. On the same day, July 11, there were also reports of airstrikes near Naungcho and Kyaukme in northern Shan State. The junta bombed areas including the Khawlee Hotel near Kyaukme and parts of Naungcho, where fighting continues between the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) and junta forces.
Although the junta rarely issues statements on its airstrikes, it’s understood that these attacks occur daily. Even when military aircraft crash, the junta usually attributes it to routine training flights rather than admitting they were shot down or failed in combat. Despite this silence, the public knows full well that these airstrikes are causing widespread civilian casualties.
While it’s not always the case that every strike only kills civilians, the military appears to conduct bombings based on intelligence about the temporary presence of resistance forces—without proper verification of whether schools, monasteries, or civilians are in the area. These attacks often seem intended not just to target fighters but to intimidate local populations and discourage them from hosting or supporting anti-junta groups.
As Myanmar enters the fifth year of armed resistance since the 2021 coup, the frequency and intensity of airstrikes have multiplied four- or five-fold compared to the early stages. Civilian casualties have also increased proportionally. This raises urgent questions: Are there no effective methods to prevent or reduce such deaths?
Publicizing these civilian deaths helps reinforce resistance to the junta. But beyond documentation, there’s also a need to consider how to protect civilians. Two main approaches are being discussed:
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Air defense measures – acquiring anti-aircraft weapons capable of downing fighter jets and helicopters.
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Civilian protection protocols – establishing bomb shelters and avoiding concentrations of people in high-risk locations.
Accessing advanced anti-aircraft weapons like MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems) is extremely difficult due to high costs and restrictions in black markets. Even ethnic armed organizations with long-standing structures can only acquire small numbers. For newer PDF units, point-defense weapons are the best they can afford, and even these are expensive and scarce.
Because of this, most resistance areas rely on local networks to share alerts and intelligence about incoming aircraft, allowing people to take shelter in dugouts or flee into cover. It’s currently the most practical and widely used defense method.
Since the 2021 coup, at least 10 junta aircraft—planes and helicopters—have been downed or crashed, but that’s still only a small fraction of their estimated 200-aircraft fleet. The air force remains a deadly threat.
On the other hand, protecting civilians can also be achieved by preventing large groups from staying in obvious targets like schools, hospitals, or monasteries—particularly in areas already sheltering IDPs. It is the responsibility of local administrations and armed groups to implement such safety measures.
If resistance forces use these places as camps or bases, they risk turning civilians into targets. International humanitarian law prohibits militarizing civilian infrastructure, but enforcement in Myanmar is very weak.
The junta clearly has no moral restraint in bombing religious or public buildings. Thus, it is essential for resistance groups to refrain from turning such sites into military targets, and to instruct civilians not to cluster in easily targetable places.
In summary, while the junta’s airstrikes and the resulting civilian deaths do help fuel anti-junta sentiment, the resistance movement must actively implement strategies to reduce civilian harm. Protecting innocent lives must remain a priority even amid an intensifying conflict.