Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 5 View
(MoeMaKa, June 6, 2025):
Who Will Be Affected by ILO’s Article 33 Sanctions? TNLA May Face Renewed Clashes Over Control of Naungcho Town
While factory workers in Myanmar continue protests and strikes demanding wage increases due to extremely low daily wages, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has announced a decision to impose sanctions on Myanmar under Article 33 of its constitution.
This move is reminiscent of the period between 1989 and 2010, when ILO joined the global community in imposing restrictions on Myanmar’s previous military government due to widespread forced labor violations.
This decision was made during ILO’s 113th International Labour Conference, where Myanmar’s labor movement was represented by the Confederation of Trade Unions Myanmar (CTUM). CTUM welcomed the decision, while some news outlets noted that it specifically targets the military junta. The use of Article 33 is rare in ILO history—this is only the third instance, with Myanmar accounting for two of them.
The basis for the sanctions includes:
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The imprisonment of 69 labor union members
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Violent attacks, including airstrikes, against civilians and workers
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Forced conscription of youth
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Over 2 million displaced persons
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More than 3,700 deaths from the March 28 earthquake
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Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
While CTUM supports the decision, some political analysts argue that such sanctions might not only harm the junta but could also reduce job opportunities for workers inside Myanmar.
Despite clear evidence of worsening labor and human rights abuses under the junta, critics of sanctions fear that they may disproportionately hurt local workers, similar to the pre-2010 era under the SPDC military regime, when economic sanctions increased hardship for the general population.
According to World Bank estimates, about 2 million people work in factories across Myanmar, including 500,000 in garment factories. With the ongoing civil war, displaced workers are often unable to return to farming or family-run businesses in their home regions. If layoffs increase due to sanctions, many may turn to undocumented migration to neighboring countries for survival.
Tensions Rise Near Naungcho as TNLA Faces Military Pressure
On June 5, while junta troops moved closer to Naungcho—a town captured by the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) during the early stages of Operation 1027—the TNLA held a press conference. Naungcho connects to strategic routes leading to Kyaukme and southern Shan towns like Ywangan. Heavy fighting has occurred near Taung Kham, which both sides seek to control.
In the initial stages of Operation 1027, the junta faced coordinated attacks from all three Brotherhood Alliance groups, with reinforcements from forces in upper Myanmar, southern Shan, and Karenni areas. Many junta bases fell during that time. But by mid-2023, Chinese diplomatic pressure stalled the offensive. Now, TNLA finds itself in a defensive posture at Naungcho.
Unlike earlier stages of the offensive, relations among the allied ethnic armed groups have cooled. Disagreements have emerged over border gate control and territory access—particularly between KIA and other forces in areas like Namkham, Kutkai, and Namphatkar. There are calls for high-level dialogue to resolve these disputes.
China’s pressure also led the MNDAA to agree to a ceasefire, effectively halting Operation 1027’s momentum. Armed groups now face the need to establish mutual understanding on territorial control to prevent setbacks.
A recent clash between SSPP/SSA and MNDAA in northern Shan resulted in casualties, reflecting unresolved tensions. The deep-rooted history of ethnic settlements in Shan State complicates territorial governance and underscores the need for negotiated agreements. If left unaddressed, the fight against the military dictatorship risks evolving into fragmented, militarized ethnic fiefdoms rather than a unified federal democratic future.