Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 25 View (MoeMaKa, June 26, 2025):
The “Peace Forum 2025” in Naypyidaw Amid Civil War
While large parts of Myanmar remain under the control of ethnic armed groups and PDF forces—and while fierce clashes continue in many regions—the junta’s National Solidarity and Peace-making Coordination Committee (NSPNC) is currently hosting a discussion titled “Peace Forum 2025” in Naypyidaw.
Even as this peace forum is underway, heavy fighting is occurring in Bago Region, and in Bhamo, Kachin State, where clashes between the KIA and junta forces have been ongoing for nearly half a year. Similar hostilities are happening in Karenni (Kayah) State and southern Shan State’s Pekon area, where junta troops and Pa-O armed groups are jointly fighting against the PDFs.
The so-called peace forum is not aimed at current warring groups like the NUG, PDFs, or the major ethnic armed organizations actively engaged in combat. Instead, it mainly includes:
-
EAOs that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 and 2018
-
A few non-signatory but non-hostile EAOs
-
Registered political parties
-
And invited diplomats from countries such as China and India
The forum appears less about resolving active conflict and more about allowing the junta to present itself as a peace-seeking government. It seems politically motivated, aiming to create a diplomatic narrative rather than engage with the real stakeholders in the civil war.
Junta’s Messaging and Political Posturing
During the opening ceremony of the forum, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing delivered a speech in which he blamed the prior “second democratic government” for the breakdown of peace efforts. He cited the rebranding of the peace conference into the 21st Century Panglong and accused the NLD-led civilian government of enacting policies that violated the law.
He also claimed that the military had cooperated as much as possible during that period and sought to improve civil–military relations. However, he said the civilian authorities abused legal processes, leading to a deviation from the democratic path and ultimately necessitating military intervention—thus attempting to justify the 2021 coup.
On foreign policy, Min Aung Hlaing stated that while Myanmar needs to maintain friendly international relations, it must not become a puppet of foreign powers. This veiled remark is widely interpreted as a reaction to Chinese pressure—especially in light of China’s growing influence in northern Shan State and its active role in controlling developments to protect its economic and geopolitical interests (such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor, gas pipelines, and BRI rail projects).
Although the junta may resent China’s leverage, it has no real alternative and continues to rely on China’s political protection and economic ties. Some interpret Min Aung Hlaing’s speech as an expression of internal frustration directed subtly at Beijing.
The Peace Forum’s Limitations
If the junta genuinely wanted peace, it would need to make a clear commitment to exit politics and return to a professional military role. Ethnic armed organizations and the NUG have repeatedly said that only such a commitment would justify meaningful dialogue.
Instead, after more than four years since the coup, the junta has lost control over vast territories, and yet continues to propose “peace” based on disarmament and elections without real compromise.
The Peace Forum 2025, therefore, is little more than a showcase event aimed at soft-target political parties and non-combatant EAOs. It lacks engagement with real stakeholders and offers no platform for open, transparent negotiation.
The result is a forum unlikely to produce substantive outcomes.
Peace and the Public Interest
True peace is a necessity for the people, but as long as armed groups—whether military or ethnic—prioritize their own power and interests above public safety and democratic values, the dream of peace will remain elusive.