Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 28 View
(MoeMaKa, June 29, 2025)
The 2025/2026 Election and the Escalation of Armed Conflict
In Myanmar, elections have taken various forms throughout history—from parliamentary democracy to one-party elections under the 1974 Constitution, and again to multiparty elections after the 1988 uprising. Elections were held under different systems depending on who held power, including the military’s rule under the 2008 Constitution.
The 2010 election, held under the 2008 Constitution, was part of the military’s transition plan to share power with elected bodies, though it was more a rebranding of military control. That system barely lasted two election terms before the military staged another coup in 2021—pushing Myanmar back into a historical cycle of repression and conflict.
In Myanmar’s modern history, elections have often marked critical turning points but have rarely resolved political crises. In nations where democracy is not yet institutionalized, elections are commonly preceded and followed by political instability—rigging, voter suppression, and even killings. When results are disputed, coups or uprisings often follow.
Myanmar’s 2020 election, which ended with the military rejecting the results and seizing power, directly led to the current full-blown civil war. This sequence aligns with broader global patterns where elections can escalate rather than resolve conflict in fragile states.
Today, amid ongoing armed conflict, many view elections as a possible exit path from the crisis. Political parties and politicians operating within the military’s system believe elections are the only nonviolent path to resolution. Meanwhile, they are facing the pressure of widespread armed resistance from groups like the PDFs and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
Myanmar’s post-independence history of almost 80 years has revolved around a cycle of parliamentary government, civil war, military coups, and authoritarian regimes. This has led to skepticism that any single armed actor—or military force—can resolve the country’s federal and democratic challenges. Many now believe that without full political reform, peace will remain elusive.
This has split political actors into two camps. Those aligned with the military system advocate elections as the only path forward, while armed resistance groups (both ethnic and Bamar-based) see any election organized by the junta as illegitimate or unacceptable. Some EAOs are actively vowing to disrupt or prevent the election.
In 2024, as the junta began household registrations for a potential election, some civil servants were abducted or killed during the enumeration process—an ominous sign for what could come if elections are held at the end of 2025 or early 2026.
There are now numerous armed factions in Myanmar—from ethnic forces to village-level PDFs—each with varying goals and positions. It’s increasingly difficult to determine who supports or opposes the election, and to what extent.
Some EAOs are more nationalistic and ethnically driven in their politics, and their interests may align more closely with the junta or specific political parties depending on regional dynamics. Behind the scenes, quiet alliances may be forming.
Whether the upcoming 2025/26 election becomes a pathway toward political resolution or an accelerant of violence is an open question—and a source of growing anxiety inside and outside the country.