Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 16 View
(MoeMaKa, June 17, 2025):
CDM-Related Assassination Incident Raises Alarms
On June 15, a school principal and her husband were shot dead in front of their home in a village in Nyaung-U Township, allegedly because she had not joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Reports state that armed members of a local People’s Defense Force (PDF) arrived by motorcycle, pulled the couple out from the school compound where they were working, and executed them outside.
Locals believe the killing was carried out by local resistance fighters. In one report, a representative from the Nyaung-U PDF reportedly told media that the village had been targeted because the victims were believed to be cooperating with the junta and “no one cared about the village.” However, no official statement has been released by local armed groups via Facebook pages or public communications.
The incident took place in Nyaungpinkant Village, located east of the Nyaung-U–Kyaukpadaung road. This region—including Nyaung-U, Myingyan, and Pakokku—has a significant PDF presence. But it remains unclear whether the unit responsible for this killing is under the control of the NUG Ministry of Defense.
Initial observations suggest that the motive for the assassination was that the principal continued her duties under the junta-controlled Ministry of Education without joining the CDM during the school reopening period.
Despite claims that she was “not from the village” or “ignored the community,” the primary reason appears to be that she remained a civil servant under the junta and did not participate in CDM.
In recent days, the announcement of the “CDM Civil Service Law” by the CRPH (Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) has reignited debate. A local community leader even commented on social media that such legal measures could lead to more CDM-related assassinations of non-participating civil servants. This latest incident seems to confirm those concerns.
Although it cannot be definitively proven that the law itself caused this killing, there is growing fear that the law could legitimize retaliatory violence—not just by the military against CDM participants, but also by armed groups against non-CDM staff.
So far, there has been no official guidance or clarification from the NUG’s Ministry of Human Rights or Ministry of Defense regarding whether such killings are acceptable or condoned. While general condemnations of junta collaborators have been made, there has not been a clear policy, directive, or accountability mechanism in response to assassinations like this one.
The region around the Nyaung-U–Kyaukpadaung Road has seen similar incidents in recent months. In April, five civilians including a local administrator were killed in Myethingwin Village, not far from the current site. In June, a shooting occurred during a meeting at a monastery in Gantgaw, resulting in the deaths of seven, including a Pyusawhti militia leader.
Despite the frequency of such incidents, there has been no official comment or clarification from township-level resistance leadership. In upper Myanmar, including Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions, there appears to be weak command structures, with village-level defense units acting independently, and no clearly defined chain of command.
As these assassinations become more frequent, there is concern that the reputation of the PDFs may suffer, especially if there is no clear command and accountability system guiding their actions.
In sum, this case exposes a deeper problem: the lack of operational discipline and centralized control among anti-junta armed forces. It also highlights the danger of politically motivated violence being normalized under the guise of revolutionary justice—something that risks undermining the moral legitimacy of the resistance movement itself.